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ABSTRACT: 
In this thesis I address Tyler Burge‟s recent challenges to Strawson‟s and 
Evans‟ theories of „mental representation‟. I take „mental representation‟ to 
be a subject‟s capacity to „singularly represent‟ physical objects within men-
tal content—for example, by having object-directed thought. While both 
Strawson and Evans take this capacity to be restricted to adult humans, be-
lieving that such thought requires high levels of cognitive development, 
Burge alleges that there is theoretical and scientific motivation to think that 
a (cognitively) less demanding theory is the correct account of mental repre-
sentation. However despite Burge‟s objections that both Strawson and Ev-
ans „hyperintellectualise‟ mental representation I argue that an „intellectual-
ism‟ based upon their discussions is not refuted by Burge‟s anti-
intellectualist opposition. I argue that, while some objections to Strawson 
and Evans might be sound, they do not automatically refute an intellectual-
ism based on the same principles and motivations. Moreover, though such 
an intellectualist theory will need to justify its demanding conditions in the 
face of Burge‟s less-demanding—and scientifically motivated—anti-
intellectualism, I argue that nothing Burge has claimed so far shows that 
such a theory should be dismissed. In conclusion then I argue that a dis-
tinctly „neo-Kantian‟ intellectualism can be seen to be a viable, alternative 
theory and can prolong a debate with Burge over the nature of mental rep-
resentation.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“We are not to rush forward along a path neither attractive nor Kantian.” 
P. F. Strawson 
Bounds of Sense 
An elucidation of a subject‟s psychology often appeals to what we might call representa-
tional states: states which are „about‟ some object in the world and might serve to rep-
resent that object as some way—i.e. big, small, tall, short etc. Though such states 
might be thought of as representing generalities or abstracts—e.g. love is beautiful—
the states I will be concerned with possess content which can refer to, „pick out‟ or—as 
I shall describe it—singularly represent a physical object in the environment. Such states 
can be posited as part of a subject‟s perception of the world, or as part of their thought 
about it; in singularly representing objects in the world around them they can be 
thought of as „bridging the gap‟ between an internal, mental life—the subject-matter 
of psychology—and the physical world. 
Such states can play a key role in psychological explanation, explaining object-
directed action and behavioural interaction with the physical world. But if we are to 
use these states in such a way we must question what sort of creatures are capable of 
such representation: is it only rational, linguistic creatures, like humans who can think 
about and perceptually represent the world, or are some of these representational ca-
pacities shared with cognitively „less-developed‟ creatures, like apes and human in-
fants? The theories of mental representation which I discuss here disagree about just 
such a question because they differ about „what it takes‟ for a creature to represent in 
either perception or thought. 
The debate begins with Tyler Burge, who opposes a class of theories which: 
“[R]equires individual‟s representations to contain general materials to make 
sense of objective representation [...] ostensibly simple, direct empirical represen-
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tation of the physical environment is held to be impossible without help from 
further representational resources” (Burge, 2010a p. 16) 
The notion of what it is to „make sense‟ of a representation (or representational state) 
will be explained in chapters one and two. However, the upshot of such a require-
ment, as Burge notes, is that to represent an object, o, (in perception or thought) a 
subject will need to possess „supplementary capacities‟ (ibid.): for example, he might 
have to be capable of explaining his thought (thus utilising linguistic capacities) or of 
representing o in the context of a distinction between appearance and reality etc. 
Burge calls such theories Second Family Individualist however I will refer to them as 
Intellectualist theories of mental representation. They are taken to be intellectualist be-
cause, in one way or another, the conditions they place on the entertainment of repre-
sentational states can be fulfilled only by subjects who possess „higher level‟, „well de-
veloped‟ or „advanced‟ cognitive capacities. On the other hand Burge propounds an 
Anti-Intellectualist view of mental representation which claims that subjects do not re-
quire such advanced capacities in order to entertain the representational states under 
discussion. One of his key aims in Origins of Objectivity is thus to disprove or rebut such 
intellectualist theories with their consequence that only „advanced‟ subjects like hu-
man beings are capable of mental representation. 
My aim in this thesis is to question whether such theories could be defended 
from Burge‟s attack. I focus on just two of the individual theorists who he opposes: 
the so-called neo-Kantians, P. F. Strawson and Gareth Evans. As I will show the dis-
tinctive feature of these „neo-Kantians‟ is that they prize a subject‟s awareness of the 
distinction between the objects he represents and his experience of them. Because such 
awareness is taken to require considerable intelligence (the capacity to conceive of the 
world as objective) these theories—or a theory based upon them—are a species of what 
I‟ll refer to as neo-Kantian intellectualism. 
Burge presents two challenges to neo-Kantian intellectualism: first, that it is 
based on discussions in Strawson and Evans which are confused and counterintuitive; 
second that any neo-Kantian intellectualism must justify its demanding, intellectualist 
conditions against a less-demanding, anti-intellectualist alternative. I will question 
whether either of these challenges constitutes a crippling objection to any form of 
neo-Kantian intellectualism, or whether a theory based on the discussions found in 
Strawson and Evans could provide a viable alternative to an anti-intellectualist ac-
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count of mental representation. 
I will not attempt to defend every aspect of the theories of Strawson and Ev-
ans—rather there are parts of Evans‟ theory of perception and their common com-
mitment to what is referred to as „Russell‟s Principle‟ which, I will argue, should be 
abandoned. Yet I will claim that we can devise a theory based on their discussions 
which preserves many of their central concerns and conflicts with Burge‟s anti-
intellectualism. In-keeping with the theorists I will be discussing here I ignore ques-
tions about the ontology or metaphysics of the representational states in question. 
Rather I will assume that they are an irreducible part of our psychological taxonomy, 
whatever the correct metaphysical explanation might be. Instead the question I will 
pursue is whether Burge is justified in rejecting this intellectualism in favour of his 
anti-intellectualist alternative. 
In chapter one I begin with Burge‟s main objections to Strawson‟s and Evans‟ 
respective discussions on mental representation: their theories of perception. But I 
will take issue with the wider significance of this challenge; chapter two will claim that 
the real battleground for Burge and the neo-Kantians is in their different approaches 
to the nature of singular thought, a debate which—so I will claim—can be divorced 
from their diverse theories of perception. Chapters three and four will then assess 
how far the neo-Kantian claims can be defended, first by examining their relation to 
the objectionable Russell‟s Principle (chapter three), then by addressing Burge‟s two 
objections. I will not show enough to settle the question between these two opposing 
sides. But I will argue—contra Burge—that there is still considerable debate to be had 
before he can claim to have disproved intellectualism and paved the way for his anti-
intellectualist theory. Rather I will claim that the writings of Strawson and Evans may 
still provide valuable insights to any theory of mental representation and that a „neo-
Kantian‟ intellectualism remains a viable alternative. 
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1 
The main basis upon which Burge rejects the accounts of mental representation in 
both Strawson and Evans is the claim that they „hyper-intellectualise‟ the notion of 
perception. He takes Strawson and Evans to maintain that “an individual cannot rep-
resent an objective subject-matter unless the individual can represent preconditions of 
objectivity[—i.e. can conceive of the subject-matter of experience as independent of 
their experience of it]” (Burge, 2010a p. 105). It is assumed—by both Burge and the 
neo-Kantians—that only cognitively advanced subjects, such as adult humans, will be 
capable of meeting such a demand. This means that less-developed creatures, such as 
infants and (possibly some) animals, will be incapable of „representing an objective 
subject-matter‟—i.e. representing physical objects in the world—at all. 
For Burge this is a problematic commitment. As §2 will show it has the poten-
tial, not only to conflict with aspects of Burge‟s theory of perception, but may even 
conflict with claims which Burge alleges to be grounded in perceptual psychology 
(2010a p. 99). In this chapter, however, I will claim that Burge‟s objections to Straw-
son‟s and Evans‟ accounts of perception are misguided. In the case of Strawson I will 
claim, in §3, that Burge‟s allegations are grounded in misinterpretation and that a sub-
tler reading could exonerate him from the worst of Burge‟s criticisms. As §4 will 
show, Evans‟ claims are more explicit; however, though they do conflict with Burge‟s 
theory of perception, they do not fall foul of the scientific claims which Burge appeals 
to. Nonetheless I will end by questioning whether a defence of neo-Kantian intellec-
tualism will rely on defending Evans‟ theory of perception. Instead I will claim that 
further discussion of their respective theories of mental representation—their theo-
ries of singular thought—will reveal the significance of this divergence from Burge. 
To begin, §1, I will explore one of Strawson‟s most intriguing discussions of per-
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ceptual experience—taken from „Perception and its Objects‟—which, I suggest, of-
fers an insight into his views. It will be necessary to focus on Strawson here (and the 
paper mentioned) both because he provides a more detailed discussion than Evans 
and because, as will be shown in §2, Burge believes Strawson‟s discussion to be cul-
pable for the confusions and mistakes in Evans‟ later conception. Burge‟s objection, 
and own theory of perception, will be explained in §2, where some ambiguities in 
Strawson‟s account will be discussed. §3 and §4 will therefore be concerned with the 
correct interpretation of both the theory of perception discussed in §1 and certain 
„incriminating‟ passages which Burge finds in Evans. 
§1. 
In „Perception and its Objects‟ Strawson responds to a widespread assumption about 
perceptual experience: “that our ordinary perceptual judgements carry implications 
not carried by a „strict account‟ of the sensible experience which gives rise to them” 
(Strawson, 1979 p. 92). The thought here is that, though what we might call our 
„commonsense‟ descriptions of experience reference entire objects—e.g. cars, tables and 
bikes—such accounts can be reduced to a „basic‟ account which references no such 
objects. As such the „commonsense‟ description „I saw a red car‟ might be broken 
down into a more monadic description such as „I saw a red patch; felt solidity etc.‟ 
Strawson‟s intended target is Ayer, however the assumption at play—that our com-
monsense accounts are extrapolations from these basic elements which can thus be 
discerned out of them—can be traced to earlier writers such as Locke and Hume. 
Against this Strawson enigmatically claims: 
“Our perceptual judgements [...] embody or reflect a certain view of the world, as 
containing objects, variously propertied, located in a common space and continu-
ing their existence independently of our interrupted and relatively fleeting per-
ceptions of them. Our making of such judgements implies our possession and 
application of concepts of such objects. But now it appears that we cannot give a 
veridical characterisation even of the sensible experience which these judgements 
[...] „go beyond‟, without reference to those objects themselves; that our sensible 
experience itself is thoroughly permeated with those concepts of objects which 
figure in such judgements.” (Strawson, 1979 p. 94) 
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Strawson is clear that this discussion, not only centres on adult humans rather than 
less developed subjects like infants (1979 p. 92), but that it concerns „non-
philosophical man‟—i.e. the way we, as conscious beings, ordinarily conceive of per-
ceptual experience in our „unreflective‟ moments, before we are tempted to respond 
to philosophical questions (1979 p. 95). What this passage suggests, first, is that our 
accounts of experience encapsulate a certain view of the world: as containing discrete, 
propertied particulars which exist objectively (i.e. outside of observation)—call these 
object-directed judgements. Secondly it suggests these judgements, and the concepts em-
ployed therein, aren‟t extrapolations from more basic experiential elements but rather 
permeate experience itself. 
So far this debate focuses on the „account‟ or „description‟ we provide of experi-
ence, the opposing thought being that these descriptions could be altered to provide a 
„stricter‟ account of the nature of the experience which commonsense accounts de-
scribe using object-terms.1 Strawson‟s response suggests one important claim about 
our perception of the world which I‟ll refer to as Strawson‟s Perceptual Thesis (PT): 
(PT):      The „concepts of objects‟ which feature in object-directed judgements 
form an irreducible part of a „strictly veridical‟ description of percep-
tual experience. 
At this stage (PT) should be understood as a rendition of the claims contained in the 
quoted passage, but not as committing Strawson to any very substantive perceptual 
theses. For example, it is not claiming that objects are the only constituents of a per-
ceptual experience, as might distinguish a form of naive realist from a (form of) pre-
sent-day representationalist. 2 Nor is it claiming that all experience must make refer-
ence to objects which actually exist, which would preclude experiences with no (spa-
tio-temporal) objects, such as hallucinations. It does not even claim that any report of 
experience necessarily references external objects, precluding descriptions like „I feel 
cold‟ (or, if the „I‟ is such an object, „there is cold‟). Rather (PT) only claims that refer-
                                                     
1 In lieu of the discovery of any terminological difference, I will (in this section) use „perception‟, 
„perceptual experience‟ and „experience‟ interchangeably—Strawson‟s exact meaning will be made 
clearer over the course of the chapter. 
2 However „Perception and its Objects‟ argues in favour of a direct realism about perception, which I 
take to be compatible with each of the views mentioned. 
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ences to objects are consistent with a „strictly veridical‟ account of perceptual experi-
ence. 
The dispute between Strawson and the latter-day empiricists are slightly tangen-
tial to the question at issue here—i.e. whether the neo-Kantians do „hyperintellectual-
ise‟ perception in conflict with Burge‟s own theory. What is interesting about (PT), as 
regards this question, is the significance of the „concepts of objects‟ mentioned both 
in the passage quoted and the formulation of (PT). Roughly Strawson‟s idea is that 
issuing such object-directed accounts requires a certain conception of objects—e.g. as 
discrete, propertied etc. However from his discussion of this concept-possession it is 
left unclear whether these concepts merely enable us to describe our experience in these 
object-directed ways or whether we require them to have experience which is of objects 
rather than a dreamy mosaic of sensations. In other words—which will become espe-
cially pertinent when we discuss Burge—whether we require such a „conception of 
objects‟ in order for the content of perception to come to refer to or represent (physical) 
objects in the first place. A fuller discussion of this ambiguity must be reserved for 
§2; for now it is necessary to ask what is involved in a „conception of an object‟ and 
what concepts must be employed in order to invoke object-directed judgements. 
We might begin by asking what sort of thing Strawson has in mind when he dis-
cusses the objects of perception. He makes clear that such objects are often con-
ceived of as the causes of our experiences (1979 p. 99), and items of which we are di-
rectly aware (1979 p. 103). Ordinarily we would think of such objects as physical enti-
ties: extended substances with physical properties and dimensions and as such these 
are the items upon which I will focus in this discussion. 
One feature which is implicit though not discussed in „Perception and its Ob-
jects‟ (as it is in other of Strawson‟s works) is the discrete nature of these objects. We 
take ourselves to experience a multiplicity of individuals, distinct both from other ob-
jects and ourselves (or our bodies). Thus our descriptions of experience are not, as 
Strawson makes clear, mere sense-data reports which list various, generic phenom-
ena—“round red patches, brown oblongs, flashes whistles, tickling sensations, 
smells” (1966 p. 99)—rather they reference entire objects like walls, bicycles, feathers 
and food. Even if an object is not entirely available to me (if, for example, the wall is 
occluded), my experience must still be described in a way which makes reference to 
this individual: I will be said to have seen „part of a wall ‟. 
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Thus we can begin to elucidate the concepts employed in an object-directed 
judgement which (PT) claimed was descriptively irreducible: 
(PTdiscrete):     A description of perceptual experience which references an object 
necessarily references a discrete individual. 
Sometimes experience can be described as of a „wholly present‟ individual—such as a 
wall, or bicycle. On other occasions however the environment we experience might 
be „featureless‟—e.g. a vast expanse of desert or a snowy tundra—in which there are 
no individual objects to be distinguished at one time. Furthermore, Evans highlights 
that there are many discrete individuals which are process-like—e.g. rainstorms (see 
Evans, 1980 p. 257), races or the reign of Henry VIII. Such particulars extend over 
time and thus may not be fully experienced in one perceptual event. Nonetheless it is 
easy to see how (PTdiscrete) might apply; for an experience of the rainstorm or a desert 
may still be described in a way which references one particular—e.g. the Gobi desert, 
or a rainstorm which can be distinguished from the one last week. Thus, like the case 
of the occluded wall, I might be said to have seen part of a larger particular which, in 
some way, is distinguishable from other such particulars. 
But there is something else which is remarkable about the objects we are said to 
experience. To see this it is necessary to dwell once more on the original dispute be-
tween Strawson and his opponent in „Perception and its Objects‟. It was claimed that 
his opponent thought object-directed descriptions could be distilled into more „ge-
neric‟ accounts—e.g. „I see a red ball‟ became „I sense roundness and redness‟. The 
sensations described in this latter report are not thought to be „distinct‟ from the sub-
ject in any way—they are simply a subject‟s states of mind. The former description, 
on the other hand, makes reference to an object which is implicitly conceived to be 
distinct from the subject. Even if the subject does not believe that there is a ball pre-
sent—if he only claims „it seems to me as if there is a ball there‟—he still describes a 
scene in which he must conceive of something which is distinct from himself. But, 
further, these objects are though capable of occupying states and possessing 
properties independently of any subject‟s experience of them.3 Not only is an implicit 
                                                     
3 Strawson suggests that, even for „secondary properties‟ like colour—which are possibly dependent 
on our experience—we pre-theoretically conceive of objects as possessing these properties independently 
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distinction made between a subject who has these private experiences and an object 
which causes them, but such objects are conceived of as public in that, unlike a 
subject‟s own experiences, it is capable of being the object of others‟ perceptions and 
observations; while others can experience the same rainstorm as me they cannot 
experience my wetness. 
A further aspect in our conception of objects is thus that we conceive of them as 
independent. As Strawson describes it: 
“we distinguish, naturally, and unreflectively, between our seeing and hearings 
and feelings—our perceiving—of objects and the objects we see and hear and 
feel; and hence quite consistently accept both the interruptedness of the former 
and the continuance in existence, unobserved, of the latter.” (1979 p. 98) 
What this passage indicates is that the objects of experience are taken to persist out-
side of our episodic perception of them. Our experience of an object is thus an event 
which is fundamentally distinct from the object itself: our object, o, might be in that 
state at time t even if we were not here to see it and might continue in that state even 
when we look away. Thus objects are independent both in that they are distinct from 
an experience of them and that they are capable of persisting when that experience 
ceases. Consequently a further emendation can be added to (PT): 
(PTindependence):  A description of perceptual experience which references an ob-
ject will invariably reference a particular which can exist inde-
pendently of such experience. 
Unlike the discreteness of such objects which is a feature of the concept of an object 
itself (it cannot be the object it is unless it is distinguishable from other objects of the 
same kind) the independence of these objects may be thought to be a merely 
contingent feature of our conception of them. Thus the fact that we conceive of it as 
existing independently does not seem essential to its being an object in the first 
place—thus (PTindependence) uses the locution „will invariably‟ rather than „necessarily‟. 
To conceive of objects in this way requires conceiving of the world as relatively 
stable: that it is simply a brute fact of the world we live in that most of the objects we 
                                                                                                                                                  
of our experience, even if that does not match our so-called „scientific‟ conception of the world (1979 
p. 104). 
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encounter will persist outside of experience and will not „pop‟ in and out of existence. 
We conceive of objects as such that we can re-encounter them (even reidentify them as 
objects we have encountered before) after periods of non-observation and as such 
that they can exist, in just the way we would experience them as being, even if they 
weren‟t experienced by us at all. 
We are now in a position to see the conception of objects involved in object-
directed judgements. The sort of descriptions to which (PT) applies—according to 
Strawson—are those which refer to discrete individuals (as per (PTdiscrete)) which are 
capable of existing outside of our fleeting perceptions of them (as per (PTindependence)). 
As noted, the question now is what significance we are to attach to such concepts: are 
they required only to make such judgements or to have object-involving perceptual 
experience (perception which „represents‟ objects) in the first place? 
Before this however a little more light can be shed on our conception of objects 
as the neo-Kantians understand it. One key question yet to be answered is how we 
individuate the objects referenced in our object-directed judgements—i.e. how is a red 
ball distinguished as a discrete object from amongst the more general sensations? The 
key factor here is the spatial position of an object; as I will show in the rest of this 
section Strawson took Spatial thinking to be necessary for a form of experience which 
is accurately described by (PT). Moreover the form of spatial thinking employed in 
object-directed judgements offers a valuable insight into neo-Kantian intellectualism 
more generally conceived. 
One description of how objects are individuated can be found in Strawson‟s ac-
count of feature-placing. This account trades on the idea that, as indicated in the passage 
from (1979, p.94), objects are propertied and located in space. Feature-placing begins with 
the claim that objects (that is, individual instances of general properties) can be 
introduced into „empirical singular statements‟ only by „narrowing down‟ from more 
general statements which index a spatial location. These feature-placing statements take 
forms like „Music can be heard in the distance‟ „Snow is here‟ etc. and form the 
starting point for a theory of singular-introduction because “(a) [they] do not make 
use of the notion of individual instances, and (b) [they] do not presuppose the 
existence of statements which do make use of this notion” (1953-4 p. 37). While such 
statements do not introduce an individual, they do introduce a general element (snow) 
and ascribe it a location in the world (there). Strawson seems to think this provides all 
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the materials we need for the introduction of an individual: if we are able to 
distinguish a place (here) where there is snow, and distinguish it from other places 
(there) where there is no snow then we have the means to identify multiple areas where 
there is snow: „here and here and here and here‟. As Strawson claims: 
“The considerations which determine multiplicity of placing become, when we 
introduce particulars, the criteria for distinguishing this patch of snow from that, 
or the first fall of snow from the second.” (1953-4 p. 39) 
What this means is that distinguishing locations in which there is snow is just the 
same as distinguishing individual instances of snow. Individuals—including more 
ordinary objects like cats—are, according to this account, individuated by spatially 
locating certain general properties. By identifying the spatial boundary at which our 
feature is located (at time t) we are able to discriminate individual, physical instances 
or objects at t which have that property. Thus space (and time) not only aids us in 
discriminating an object from all other objects (which Strawson takes to be necessary 
for reference) it also aids us in individuating that object as a propertied particular in the 
first place. In other words, objects are individuated in experience by identifying a 
location or place which harbours a property and distinguishing that from contiguous 
places—and different objects—by contrasting the properties present. 
Of course we are searching here for an account of how our perceptual experience al-
lows us to individuate objects such that an object-involving judgement can form a 
correct account of it. So far feature-placing is touted as an account at the level of 
thought and reference, describing how individuals can be introduced into proposi-
tions. However the situation is a little too complicated to dismiss the relevance of fea-
ture-placing to Strawson‟s account of perception: for one thing (PT) explicitly claims 
that object-involving statements—i.e. statements which will depend on feature-
placing, in Strawson‟s terms—form an „irreducible description‟ of experience, suggest-
ing that the divide between perception of objects and thought about such objects is not 
so clear cut. Yet, whatever the apparent relation turns out to be, feature-placing offers 
one, important idea which seems essential to an account of object-individuation: that 
objects are individuated by sensibly discriminating their boundaries—i.e. the place 
where they end and another object begins. This suggests that the spatial properties of 
an object—e.g. its‟ relation to other objects—plays an invaluable role in allowing a 
subject to discriminate it. To locate something spatially is, at bottom, to locate a place 
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and one does this by distinguishing the boundaries of a property-instance from 
surroundings which manifest a different property. Thus a patch of snow, or even a 
cat, can be distinguished from the mud which surrounds it by recognising the 
difference between snow, cat and mud. Another way of putting this is that objects 
(and, by extension, distinguishable places in space) are located through their relation to 
another particular. 
As we will see in chapter two Evans famously distinguishes between two ways in 
which a subject may spatially locate an object which, so I will attempt to show, can 
reveal an extra dimension of neo-Kantian intellectualism. Now though, we have a 
clearer idea of the conception of objects which Strawson takes us to possess. We can 
assume that conceiving of objects as existing independently of any subject‟s experi-
ence of them—i.e. conceiving of objects as objective—requires highly advanced cogni-
tive capacities which neither very young children nor non-human animals are com-
monly taken to have. Thus the question highlighted by the original formulation of 
(PT) becomes important in understanding Strawson‟s intellectualism: is this concep-
tion of objects necessary merely to describe experience in object-directed terms or to 
have experience of objects (as opposed to a sensory-mosaic) in the first place? In the 
next section I will present Burge‟s answer to this question and explain why he takes it 
to be a problem for Strawson‟s theory of perception. 
§2. 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter Burge accuses both Strawson and Evans of 
„hyperintellectualising‟ the notion of the perception of objects by claiming that one 
needs to conceive of them as objective before one can perceptually represent them. 
He does not discuss „Perception and its Objects‟ specifically, but he seems to take his 
objection to Strawson‟s understanding of perception to range over Strawson‟s work. 
As such I take the theses advanced in that paper to be of great importance in under-
standing Burge‟s objection and in assessing its validity. Here I will present a Burgian 
interpretation of the ambiguity identified in that paper: whether the conception of 
objects identified under the labels (PTdiscrete) and (PTindependence) is necessary merely to 
describe perception as object-directed or to have experience of objects in the first place 
(i.e. to represent them). 
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Before I discuss this, a word should be said about Burge‟s own theory of percep-
tion. He claims that perception consists in the representation of physical items in repre-
sentational content. For Burge perception of o is constituted by what we might call „mental 
content‟ which singularly represents o. Such representation involves two main compo-
nents: singular reference which „picks out‟ an individual, o, and the attribution of a more 
general property.4 A relevant example of such representation is a proposition: the 
proposition „That is water‟ attributes a general kind (e.g. being water) to a certain par-
ticular (e.g. certain liquid particles).  As such it requires the content to bear a referen-
tial relation to some entity in the world such that a kind (water-hood) can be attrib-
uted to a particular picked out from a multiplicity of relevantly similar particulars. As 
Burge describes it: 
“I believe that perceptual content is not propositional. But it is analogous to 
some propositional representational contents in having singular elements that 
purport to pick out particulars and general, attributive elements that purport to 
attribute properties to the particulars.” (2005 p. 6) 
In singularly representing o content is subject to accuracy conditions regarding the attri-
bution of a general property to o: because it is representing the individual, o, its attri-
bution will be accurate only if o is as represented (2010a p. 83). The singular and gen-
eral elements work together to provide perception of a world which, much like the 
neo-Kantian perceptual thesis, contains individual instances of more general kinds 
(see Burge, 2005 p. 6). To represent a given o is to represent it as some way, or as hav-
ing some property. 
In the face of this theory the original way of putting the question raised in §1—
i.e. whether this conception of objects is required to perceptually represent such ob-
jects—seems very apt. But, from what Strawson has to say, Burge believes it is not so 
clear what the answer is: 
“The first is [...] the project of explaining minimal constitutive conditions on objective rep-
resentation of the physical environment. Objective representation comprises accu-
rate representation of physical entities as having specific physical characteristics. 
The second project is that of explaining constitutive conditions for having a con-
                                                     
4 Burge is happy to describe this singular element as ‘referring’ to o however, in the interests of keeping 
clear that this terminology refers to mental representation and not language I will largely call this „sin-
gular representation‟ of an object o. 
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ception of mind-independent entities as mind-independent. I call this second pro-
ject that of explaining conditions for our conception of objectivity.” (2010a p. 156) 
Since Strawson fails to distinguish between these two projects, so Burge believes, his 
discussion of „perceptual experience‟ inadvertently “reduces the problem on explain-
ing minimum conditions on experience of objective reality to the problem of explain-
ing necessary conditions on our conception of the relation between perceptions and 
their objects” (2010a p. 161). In short Strawson‟s discussions of what it is to experi-
ence objectively—i.e. consciously aware of the independence of objects—end up 
making claims about the necessary conditions for the representation of objects in mental 
content. 
This supposed prevarication in Strawson becomes especially troubling in Evans 
who was, undoubtedly, directly influenced by Strawson‟s work. Evans, as Burge ar-
gues, explicitly identifies „objective reference‟ (content‟s ability to be about a single 
object) with a subject‟s capacity to conceive of that object as objective (2010a p. 182). 
In short, representing o as being some way, F, requires representing o as part of a pub-
lic space, or world which persists outside of observation. As such Evans “turns 
Strawson‟s slide into a plunge” (ibid.). 
If Strawson and (by this interpretation) Evans believe that a subject must be able 
to make object-directed judgements—i.e. must conceive of objects in a certain way—in 
order to represent them then they must believe that such representing requires ad-
vanced conceptual capacities. As discussed in §1 such judgements invoke „concepts of 
objects‟ (or a conception of objects) as independently existing, discrete, propertied 
individuals—a capacity not thought to be possessed by cognitively less-developed 
subjects like infant humans or non-human animals. Thus, on the principle under dis-
cussion, such subjects would be unable to represent objects in mental content; this 
constitutes what Burge calls a „hyper-intellectualisation‟ of singular representation 
(more accurately, perceptual experience). As it is levelled against Strawson and Evans 
this charge can be construed as a charge of what I will call Broad Intellectualism (BI) re-
garding mental representation: 
(BI):         (For all physical objects, o, and for all forms of mental representation 
of o) A subject, S, cannot represent o unless he can conceive of o as a 
discrete particular existing independently of his experience. 
- 20 - 
 
(BI) is a troublesome commitment to have: it not only entails that perceptual repre-
sentation of objects requires advanced cognitive development, it also entails that any 
form of mental representation (including beliefs)  requires such conceptual capacities. 
Burge‟s criticism of this is simple: “Common sense and empirical science supports the 
view that animals and young children have perceptions and beliefs about bodies” 
(2010a p. 162). 
Of course Strawson or Evans could deny that perception is inherently represen-
tational and thus resist the claim that their theories preclude young children and ani-
mals from having „perceptions of objects‟ (the point about beliefs must be deferred to 
chapter four). Alternatively they could concede that perception functions to represent 
objects in representational content but could claim that it is constituted by concepts or 
what we might call conceptual content (of course this would again entail that those who 
lack the conceptual capacities required are unable to „perceive objects‟ in the relevant 
sense). 
Either answer would be problematic for Burge. To claim that perception is not 
representational would, so he claims, be at odds with fundamental assumptions in 
perceptual psychology. He takes it to be essential to the psychological explanation in 
such fields that perception is representational (see Burge, 2005). It is unclear whether 
the claim that perceptual content is conceptual is equally at odds with the science but 
it does come into conflict with fundmental aspects of Burge‟s own theory: he claims 
that at the level of perception, the representation of objects is completely non-
conceptual. As the quotation from (2005, p.6) makes clear, Burge distinguishes per-
ceptual representation from propositional representation. In propositional representa-
tion the general attribute applied to a represented particular is a concept (2010a p. 36). 
Such representation, says Burge, takes place only at the level of thought, while per-
ception can be distinguished by its non-conceptual nature: 
“I use „thought‟ to apply only to propositional attitudes, or representational con-
tents with propositional structure. I believe that perception is not propositional 
and hence is not thought. Perception lacks a propositional structure. So percep-
tual attributives are not concepts, and perceptions are not thoughts.” (2010a p. 
36) 
As such Burge‟s theory of perceptual representation can be roughly distinguished 
from representation in thought along conceptual/non-conceptual lines: perception is 
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essentially representation in non-conceptual content while thought representation is 
in conceptual content. 
Burge‟s non-conceptualism seems to rely on his anti-individualistic account of 
content-determination. Anti-individualism can be formulated in many ways but essen-
tially it involves the claim that the individuation and nature of mental states (or men-
tal state kinds) is determined by causal interaction with entities and natural kinds in 
the external environment.  A useful formulation is as follows: 
“(A`) The natures of mental states that empirically represent the physical envi-
ronment depend constitutively on relations between specific aspects of the envi-
ronment and the individual, including causal relations, which are not in them-
selves representational” (2010a p. 61) 
Representational content is taken to be intimately bound up with the environment 
such that, if environmental properties were relevantly similar (e.g. there was a liquid 
with all the phenomenal properties of water) but compositionally different from the 
actual environment (e.g. this liquid was not H2O but XYZ), the representational con-
tent arising over time from causal transactions would be different. 
The representational kinds applied to specified particulars are (at least partially) 
constituted by causal (or inherited causal) contact with natural kinds.  The relevant 
environment is that in which the individual (and his ancestors) have had to func-
tion—to find food, reproduce etc.  The representational kinds he employs in percep-
tion are related to the functions he (or his perceptual system) has evolved to perform: 
“[T]he individuation and natures of perceptual states are necessarily associated 
with certain relations between the types of states that are part of the perceptual 
system of the individual, on the one hand, and kinds of objects, properties and 
relations to the physical environment, on the other.” (2005 p. 4) 
However there is a minimal condition on representing the world, before we are capa-
ble of doing so accurately, and that is that our content actually refers to a particular. 
Burge‟s anti-individualist theory affects content-determination at this singular level as 
well. Burge can use the causal role of objects in perception to determine the refer-
ence-relation between content and particular: 
“Singular aspects of perceptual representational content depend for successful 
referential representation on being caused by particulars” (2010a p. 83) 
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In advancing (A`) Burge can claim that reference occurs in non-conceptual, percep-
tual content, allowing cognitively less-developed species to singularly represent so 
long as they are capable of perceptual representation. In such a way he is completely 
opposed to (BI) which precludes less-developed beings from representing the envi-
ronment. 
I will not seek to question Burge‟s appeal to scientific data regarding perception, 
nor will I argue with him that (BI) seems a rather untenable position. Even outside of 
a commitment to Burge‟s views it seems hard to deny that less developed creatures 
cannot represent objects in their environment. Often psychological explanation and 
an explication of such creatures‟ mental content will appeal to singular representations 
(though these are not always conceived to be conceptual). Consequently a position as 
strong as (BI)—which claims that all singular representation must take place in con-
ceptual mental content—requires considerable defence. However, as I will show in 
the following two sections, it is unclear that this is a position upon which neo-
Kantian intellectualism need rely. 
§3. 
In the last section it was shown that Burge takes Strawson implicitly to affirm (BI) 
while Evans, under his influence, makes his own commitment explicit. I will discuss 
Burge‟s interpretation of Evans in the next section, for now I will address his charges 
against Strawson. 
Strawson‟s claims about perceptual experience are hard to understand in the con-
text of today‟s debate. Some phrases, especially from „Perception and its Objects‟, 
seem to chime with a Burgian interpretation—he mentions, for example that, (PT) 
does not have “the character of an interpretation [...] of the content of our sensible ex-
perience” (1979 p. 95, my emphasis). What such remarks might suggest is that (PT), 
not only lays conditions on a „strict report‟ of experience but on the content of 
experience such that, individuted objects could not be part of the content—i.e. could 
not be represented—without a conception of Space. But I believe that it is hard to 
place too strong an interpretation on these comments. Specifically it seems 
presumptuous to claim that, whenever Strawson mentions experience, or even the 
contents of experience, he has in mind precisely the type of content Burge discusses. 
- 23 - 
 
It is thus difficult to maintain that (PT) directly links to experiential content. Indeed I 
believe it is possible to read Strawson‟s use of „experience‟ as having an entirely 
different resonance from the contemporary use and Burge‟s notion of 
representational content. 
(PT) might be thought to be related to Kant‟s famous saying „intuitions without 
concepts are blind‟. It might be thought that to be „blind‟ is to be lacking in content 
which singularly represents an individuated object. As Burge interprets Strawson we 
are „blind‟ until we can bring to bear a certain „conception of objects‟; thus our 
„intuitions‟, or most primary and basic sensations, of the world are not „object-
directed‟. This is not the only possible interpretation of that phrase, consider Burge‟s 
own interpretation of Kant‟s intended meaning: 
“A cognition is an objective conscious representation whose actual objective va-
lidity can in principle be established by argument, by the individual with the cog-
nition. Cognition requires an ability to argue something about a representation. 
Kant‟s dictum attributes blindness to intuitions relative to obtaining cognition, in 
this demanding sense.” (2010 p. 155) 
What this suggests is that to be „blind‟ is not to lack content, not even to lack content 
which singularly represents, it is to fail to be a cognition: a form of conceptual 
content which reflects a self-conscious understanding—an ability to „argue 
something‟—about the relation of one‟s experience to an objective world. 
Further illumination of such a reading is provided by McDowell‟s description of 
Evans on experience: 
“What makes it intelligible, in his view, that the eyes of empirical thought are 
opened is not the claim that, even considered in abstraction from any connection 
with spontaneity [(i.e. conceptual capacities)], experiences have (non-conceptual) 
content. It is the claim that that content is available to spontaneity: that it is a 
candidate for being integrated into the conceptually organised world-view of a 
self-conscious thinker. I am only stressing an aspect of Evans‟ own view when I 
say that, according to him, the item that an experience is, considered in itself (in 
abstraction from the availability to spontaneity in virtue of which it acquires the 
title „experience‟), is blind.” (McDowell, 1994 pp. 54-5) 
This passage suggests that what makes an experience „sighted‟ rather than „blind‟ is 
„being integrated‟ into a self-conscious experience. Such a subject might, as Burge puts it, 
conceive or represent mind-independent entities as mind-independent. Thus they will 
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distinguish between their perception and the way of the world—that is, they 
appreciate that the two might diverge, that they might be unreceptive etc. In such a 
way, it is thought, they become conscious of the distinction between general 
sensations—e.g. cold now, buzzing now etc.—and the world, or more specifically, the 
public particulars within the world which cause these sensations—e.g. arctic tundras 
and bees (see also Evans, 1980 p. 249). Experience thus becomes „sighted‟ when a 
subject is conscious of this dichotomy; when he is not merely stumbling through a 
blizzard of sensations (or intuitions) described in general, subjective terms, but when 
he is conscious of a set of discrete objects in a world which extends beyond his 
experience—an experience to which (PT) applies. The point of (PT) is that all such 
experiences have a certain form: of discrete, persisting objects which constitute the 
world of experience. The intellectualist assertion is that to appreciate this form and to 
have experience which can issue in a consciousness of the distinction between one‟s 
sensory experience and the objects which cause it we require certain conceptual 
capacities. 
The view here is abstract and might remain rather vague, however what it sug-
gests is that there is a distinction to be made between the representational content of ex-
perience and a subject‟s consciousness of that content. A perception can be contentful 
but „blind‟ in that, though it actually (and anti-individualistically) represents o, a subject 
is not in a position to appreciate it as an „experience‟ of a discrete object describable by 
object-directed judgements as opposed to a mere sensation described in general terms 
like „wetness now‟. If such a claim can be minimally understood then (PT) needn‟t be 
outlining the content of experience as Burge understands it; rather, it is compatible 
with this reading that that content is determined independently of a subject‟s con-
sciousness of experience as such. 
On this interpretation Strawson is not „prevaricating‟ between the project of ex-
plaining conditions on representation and outlining concepts essential to our concep-
tion of an objective world. Such a schema is misleading: (PT) claims instead that this 
conception of the world is so ingrained that we cannot make sense of our (adult) ex-
perience without it. This remains quietist on the more technical notion of perceptual 
content and representation with which Burge is concerned and could be compatible 
with Burge‟s view. 
As noted, (PT) is derived from „Perception and its Objects‟—a paper which 
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Burge does not discuss. Nonetheless Strawson‟s concern in that paper—with a con-
ception of experience as being of an objective world—chimes with the discussions to 
which Burge briefly alludes when he makes his objection (e.g. Strawson, 1966 pp. 98-
117). But nothing in either of these discussions should lead us to favour Burge‟s 
interpretation over that offered here. Rather it seems to me that, in each of these 
discussions, Strawson is very focused on the notion of „experience‟ he is discussing: 
namely, conscious experience that we enjoy as a developed adult and which irrevocably 
employs certain concepts. To read him as also making statements about the notion of 
content-determination—in the technical sense which Burge requires for 
contemporary, psychological explanations—is to potentially import something into 
Strawson‟s work which is entirely beyond his view. In any event Burge has no right to 
adopt this wholly uncharitable reading, which commits Strawson to (BI), over a less 
abrasive reading which nonetheless (plausibly) preserves Strawson‟s concerns. As 
such a charge of hyper-intellectualism seems misplaced, and a charge of unduly influ-
encing the later debate, unwarranted. 
§4. 
What of Burge‟s claim that Strawson‟s thesis leads Evans to explicitly adhere to (BI)? 
Such an accusation would be controversial at best since Evans is often seen as the 
champion of non-conceptual representation. As such it is unclear that he conflicts 
with the forms of psychological explanation offered in perceptual psychology. But 
Burge claims that when it comes to singular representation—i.e. when content is about an 
individual object—Evans is clear in stating that this does not occur at the level of 
perceptual representation; as such he is clearly opposed to a fundamental tenet of 
Burge‟s own theory. 
For Evans perception is one way in which a subject might glean or „absorb‟ 
information about objects in the world (other ways include testimony and memory). 
Perceiving objects in the world causes informational states (or informational content) 
in the subject‟s psychology—or, as Evans calls it, Information System—which govern 
our ensuing beliefs and judgements about the world (1982 pp. 121-2). Thus my 
perception of a red ball causes a certain informational content which leads me to the 
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belief „there is a red ball‟.5 
But the way in which these states represent the objects which cause them differs 
substantially from Burge‟s similar story of perceptual representation. For Evans this 
informational content is „of or from‟ an object in the same way as a photograph is 
described as being „of an object‟: there is a mechanism which produces an 
„impression‟ of a given scene (e.g. a red ball) and which can be assessed for accuracy 
insofar as the representation produced is similar to the particular which caused the 
representation—e.g. how far the „photograph‟ resembles the original red ball. But, 
intriguingly, for Evans the content of such a representation can be specified in an „open 
sentence structure‟ which does not refer to the particular object in question: 
“Notice that I have explained the sense in which a photograph is of an object, or 
objects, without presupposing that a specification of its content must make refer-
ence to that object, or those objects.” (Evans, 1982 p. 125) 
“We see here, the need for a distinction between, on the one hand, an a-
representation (i.e. a species of particular-representation, in a specification of 
whose content mention of a would figure: something which represents, and mis-
represents, a) and, on the other, something which, without being an a-
representation, is a representation of a.” (footnote ibid.) 
As Burge notes, these passages suggest that, even though Evans allows for some form 
of non-conceptual representation he rejects singular representation of individual 
objects: “an informational state can be of a without having a singular content that 
represents (or misrepresents) a. [...] a is not singularly represented” (Burge, 2010a p. 
184). 
Evans thus rejects a key feature of Burge‟s anti-individualist account of percep-
tual representation: for him the representational content arising from causal contact 
with a particular is neutral as to the object represented. Suppose a and b are numeri-
cally distinct but otherwise identical red balls. For Evans the representational content 
arising from perception of a and b can be expressed thus: a→RxBx, and b→RxBx. 
Even though the objects perceived are distinct the informational content which arises 
is qualitatively identical—both are red balls and are represented as such. In contrast, 
for Burge, the representational contents of a perception of a and b will differ signifi-
                                                     
5
 Though the states themselves are independent of such beliefs—i.e. they have the same 
representational content (e.g. of a red ball) whether or not the subject believes there to be such an object 
(1982 p. 123). 
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cantly: a→RaBa and b→RbBb. Though both are represented as red balls (the „general‟ 
elements of the representation are similar) the representations comprise a singular 
element which represents a particular red ball. 
In adopting such a theory of informational content it might be thought incon-
trovertible that Evans commits to (BI): in claiming that the belief-independent, in-
formational content arising from perception fails to singularly represent he effectively 
reserves singular representation of particular objects to intentional thought. However 
it is unclear that he thereby comes into conflict with some of the central tenets of 
perceptual psychology as Burge defines them: though he doesn‟t think perception 
singularly represents Evans is not guilty of claiming that perception is not representa-
tional and as such does not obviously conflict with Burge‟s claim that perception is 
representational. 
Similarly Evans‟ theory need not conflict with Burge‟s anti-individualist view of 
the formation of perceptual attributives—the „general‟ elements of perceptual states. 
As Burge describes it such attributives are formed through interaction with the kinds 
of the natural world: creatures of a given species develop certain representational kinds 
which further generations inherit; further, as Burge claims, such a view is „presup-
posed‟ by perceptual psychology (2005 p. 9) (2010a pp. 98-101). But, since Evans al-
lows that perceptual representations employ general elements—i.e. elements also em-
ployed in other perceptual representations—and since he never gives his own expla-
nation of their origin, there seems no reason to think that he couldn‟t adopt Burge‟s 
anti-individualist account. 
So far Evans‟ only crime, in committing to (BI), is conflicting with one of 
Burge‟s central claims about perception: that perception singularly represents the ob-
ject one perceives. He does not obviously seem to run afoul of any of the claims Burge 
sees as central to perceptual psychology. Perhaps this will be seen as the place at 
which neo-Kantian intellectualism should be defended; certainly that is Burge‟s view. 
However, given the ambiguity in Strawson (discussed in §3), the significance of this 
disagreement can be questioned; for it could be that Evans is capable of abandoning 
this commitment given the right motivation and the neo-Kantian view of perception 
can be brought into line with Burge‟s preferred account. 
It is hard to see what turns on Evans‟ conception of informational content. 
Seemingly the story of how informational content governs our ensuing judgements 
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could remain the same if the content were specified as RaBa. Similarly, as §3 made 
clear, Strawson‟s discussion of perceptual experience seems amply explained within a 
theory like Burge‟s. Consequently Burge‟s antipathy towards the neo-Kantians for 
committing to (BI) seems strangely misplaced: such a commitment—so far as it is 
manifest—could be abandoned without much fuss. 
However, as I will show in chapter two, there is a significant conflict between 
Burge and the neo-Kantians over the matter of singular thought—thought about an 
object (for our purposes, a physical object). As the next chapter will show, both 
Strawson and Evans commit to a view of singular thought which requires similarly 
advanced cognitive capacities: a view which Burge‟s own theory opposes. A commit-
ment to (BI) could become a significant source of conflict, insofar as it is a necessary 
commitment if one is to hold this „intellectualist‟ view of singular thought. If it were 
shown that either Strawson or Evans holds this view of thought because of a com-
mitment to (BI)—perhaps, a commitment to Evans‟ account of informational con-
tent—then a defence of any theory derived from Strawson and Evans may require a 
defence of this principle. However if it could be shown that their theories (or that a 
theory derived from them) need not rely on such a principle then it is clear that a de-
fence of (BI) would not be needed and Burge‟s main objection is misplaced. In order 
to settle this question, I will turn to Strawson‟s and Evans‟ accounts of singular 
thought.
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2 
In this chapter I move from a focus on perceptual representation to the differing ap-
proaches Burge and the neo-Kantians take to singular thought. Like perceptual repre-
sentation singular thought can be a mental representation of the physical world. 
However unlike perception, which was construed as non-conceptual, singular thought 
is taken to be a representation essentially composed of conceptual content. Thus 
Burge often claims that, if a belief is to be attributed to a creature, they must show the 
capacity for some form of conceptual inference often utilising information from per-
ceptual contact (2010b p. 45; Burge, 2010a, 2003 p. 519). For ease of discussion—
rather than a very substantive metaphysical commitment—I will speak of beliefs as 
essentially propositionally structured. Within such a propositional structure, singular 
thought is understood to singularly represent an individual object and to attribute a 
general element—e.g. ‘o is F’. It differs from perception, however, primarily in the fact 
that this general attributive, F, is what I‟ll refer to as a conceptual attributive: a general 
attributive which is conceptual.6 
The last chapter ended with the question of whether (BI) was a necessary or at 
least significant commitment in a characterisation of what I‟ve called neo-Kantian 
intellectualism. An affirmative answer would mean that a defence of neo-Kantian in-
tellectualism must defend this commitment; a negative answer on the other hand 
could show that Strawson‟s and Evans‟ theories (or an account based upon them) can 
be defended independently of it. This means that a distinctly neo-Kantian theory of 
singular thought would be compatible with Burge‟s theory of perception.  
The answer to the above question will thus rely on comparing and explaining the 
differing approaches to singular thought adopted by Burge and the neo-Kantians. By 
                                                     
6 For now I will take the idea of a „conceptual attributive‟ as a primitive. Further discussion and elu-
cidation of this idea can be found in chapter four. 
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revealing the assumptions which lead Strawson and Evans to commit to a distinctly 
„intellectualist‟ view we will be able to see whether they must appeal to a commitment 
to (BI) in order to either substantiate or defend their intellectualist accounts. In §1 I‟ll 
illustrate that both Strawson and Evans commit to an intellectually demanding ac-
count of singular thought under which thinking subjects must possess the capacities 
required to conceive of objects, as per (PT). Though I‟ll claim that they both commit 
to a similar, broad requirement I will largely focus on Evans‟ discussion as not only is 
it more detailed but the concerns highlighted in the previous chapter seem closer to 
the surface. In §2 I will show how this commitment leads to a demanding account of 
demonstrative thought—i.e. thought about objects we‟re currently perceiving. In §3 I 
will show that Burge differs substantially in his own account of singular thought and 
will address the question of whether this difference depends on either Strawson or 
Evans adopting (BI). 
§1. 
Both Strawson and Evans are famous for committing to what is often called Russell’s 
Principle. In this section I will go through the assumptions and arguments which lead 
both Strawson and Evans to commit to a version of this principle. (As my task in this 
chapter is to explain the commitments and character of this view of singular thought, 
a detailed assessment of these arguments must be postponed to chapter three.) 
Loosely construed Russell‟s Principle could be described by the idea that, to 
think of an object, o, a subject, s, must „know which‟ object o is. As Evans notes, this 
principle is hard to elucidate (1982 p. 89) however it can be roughly understood (as it 
is by him and Strawson) as the idea that, in thinking of o, s is able to discriminate or 
„single out‟ o from other, relevantly similar candidates—i.e. s knows that his thought is 
about o and not another object, a. Thus „know which‟ here references a subject‟s abil-
ity to uniquely identify the object of their thought. 
Like Russell‟s original formulation Strawson seemed to believe that, on hearing a 
speaker refer to an object with the utterance „that is o‟, s could „know which‟ object o 
is through „acquaintance‟, or—for Strawson, if not Russell—when one could “sensi-
bly discriminate, the particular being referred to, knowing that it is that particular” 
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(1959 p. 18). In non-demonstrative cases Strawson believes that a subject should also 
be in a position to know which object o is: 
“even though the particular in question cannot itself be demonstratively identi-
fied, it may be identified by a description which relates it uniquely to another par-
ticular which can be demonstratively identified.” (1959 p. 21) 
In showing that subjects know which object o is across both demonstrative and non-
demonstrative cases Strawson can be seen as implicitly endorsing the idea that 
thought about o—or reference to o—requires the subject to fulfil a „know-which‟ con-
dition.7 Evans is more explicit on this point and offers perhaps a clearer elucidation of 
what he takes the principle to be: 
“I shall suppose that the knowledge which it requires is what might be called dis-
criminating knowledge: the subject must have a capacity to distinguish the object of 
his judgement from all other things.” (1982 p. 89) 
Such a principle immediately looks a demanding, and potentially intellectualist condi-
tion on singular thought: a „capacity to distinguish o‟ might require highly developed, 
cognitive capacities. But to provide a further elucidation of the principle, and to see 
whether it is a distinctly intellectualist theory, it is necessary to ask why Strawson and 
Evans committed to such a requirement. 
To do this we will need to depart from Strawson‟s discussion. Although he 
clearly commits to a „know-which‟ requirement the reasoning and assumptions behind 
such a commitment get a much fuller exposition in Evans. Consequently it is that to 
which I will turn to discern why such a principle is adopted. Evans‟ reasons for com-
mitting to Russell‟s Principle and arguments for that principle are easily discernable 
once he is read as making a latent assumption: that, to have a thought, a subject must 
understand the content of that thought; hence a thought ‘a is F’, attributed to a subject, 
manifests both “his understanding of a and his understanding of F” (1982 p. 101). 
Another way of putting this is to say that, to have a thought, a subject must under-
stand what it would be for that thought to be true (Evans, 1982 p. 105; McDowell, 
1990 p. 256). That is, a subject must understand what it would be for the world to 
                                                     
7 Strawson suggests that reference to o within speaker-hearer identification can be put on a par with 
thought about o (1959 p. 61). Though it is not clear that either Evans or Burge would conflate speaker-
hearer identification and reference in this way they all seem to agree that the conditions placed on a 
subject referring to o are also the conditions for entertaining thought about o. 
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contain a particular object, a, which is F (crucially for Evans, this is not equivalant to 
the claim that it must be possible for a subject to verify that his thought is true; see 
1982, p.94). 
One of the consequences of this assumption of Evans‟ is his introduction of 
what he calls the Generality Constraint. This states that, just as understanding the 
sentence „a is F‟ manifests the ability to refer to a in other sentences and to describe 
other objects as F, having the thought ‘a is F’ must manifest the ability to think 
indefinitely many „a‟-thoughts and indefinitely many ‘is F’-thoughts (1982 pp. 100-5). 
Understanding a thought, for Evans, thus consists in the possession of certain 
capacities; to see why I will go through each of these supposed capacities in turn and 
show how they relate to Evans‟ central assumption. 
Clearly, understanding ‘a is F’ requires what we might call „possession of the 
concept ‘F’. But, for Evans, this means not only knowing what it would be for a to be 
F (thus knowing what it would be for a thought or sentence ‘a is F’ to be true), but 
knowing what it would be for any object to F:8 
“any thought which we can interpret as having the content that a is F involves the 
exercise of an ability—knowledge of what it is for something to be F—which 
can be exercised in indefinitely many distinct thoughts, and would be exercised 
in, for instance, the thought that b is F.” (1982 p. 103) 
To think of some object as F I have to know what it would be for that object to in-
stantiate the conditions of F-ness. Perhaps that is analytic (given Evans‟ assumption) 
but the thought here is that I must also know that the concept—e.g. of happiness—is 
not tied to one individual for its conditions of instantiation. Even if one would never 
apply the concept to another individual (e.g. imagine one man (John) is the only happy 
individual in existence) the understanding of what makes that attribution true of John is 
the understanding of what would make the attribution true of any other (happy) indi-
vidual. 
This picture of concept-possession might seem intuitive, however it becomes 
less clear why the Generality Constraint applies equally to thoughts about individual 
objects: why should one thought ‘a is F’ imply that I can think of a in indefinitely 
many thoughts (e.g. ‘a is G’ 1982, pp. 103-4)? The reason Evans had for thinking this 
                                                     
8 This, of course, is restricted only to objects of which it is possible to be F: though possession of the 
concept „Square‟ might enable indefinitely many thoughts of square individuals, it can never enable a 
thought of an individual square circle. 
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also shows us why his assumption—that having a thought ‘a is F’ requires under-
standing what it would be for this to be true—entails a „know-which‟ condition. For 
to understand what it would be for ‘a is F’ to be true requires, not just thinking of any 
object as F, but of thinking of a specified object, a, as F. Unlike the thought ‘(Ǝx) x is F’, 
‘a is F’ will only be made true by the particular object in question being F; hence, to 
understand what it would be for ‘a is F’ to be true a subject would have to know what 
it would be for the particular object in question, a, to be F. For example to know 
what it is for the sentence „John is a happy man‟ to be true, I cannot only know what it 
is for a man (any man) to be happy, I have to know what it is for John to be happy. 
This implies that I must know what it is for my thought to be about John—and not 
some other object, like Harry—in the first place: if I did not possess this knowl-
edge—if I were unable to say whether my „thought‟ were about John or Harry9—then 
I would not really know what it would be for my thought to be true for I would not 
know which individual must be happy. 
Thus, so Evans claims, any thought about John must manifest a way or means of 
thinking of John—e.g. demonstratively as „that man‟ (in front of me) or under a 
unique description „the only happy man‟—which, for Evans, roughly corresponds to a 
Fregean sense (1982 p. 104). My way of thinking of John—which enables me to know 
that my thought concerns John—must be such that it discriminates John from all 
other possible objects of thought. It must certainly discriminate him from relevantly 
similar objects, like Harry, (such that I can know my thought is about John and not 
Harry) but, in so doing, discriminates John from seemingly irrelevant objects like 
chairs and tables—„that man‟ and „the only happy man‟ seem to automatically exclude 
non-men objects. This seemingly satisfies the Generality Constraint because whatever 
means we have of thinking of John at one particular time constitutes a means of 
thinking of John at any time—e.g. as „the only happy man (at that time)‟ or a memory 
of „that man‟ at that time. For Evans such a means constitutes an Idea of a—
“something which makes it possible for a subject to think of an object in a series of 
indefinitely many thoughts” (1982 p. 104). 
So much for how Evans‟ central assumption leads to the requirement that we 
have to know which object a is, if we‟re to entertain a singular thought about a. How-
ever one further factor in understanding a thought like ‘a is F’, for Evans, is knowing 
                                                     
9 For Evans it is unclear whether this kind of indecision constitutes any thought at all (1982 p. 115). 
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the Fundamental Ground of Difference for the type of object a is. To close this section I 
will therefore discuss Evans‟ notion of a Fundamental Level of Thought and how it relates 
to a Know-which condition. 
Evans implies that we can distinguish between different types of objects as well as 
between different individuals of the same type: thus we will be able to distinguish 
numbers from colours as well as differentiate between individuals of each sort. In iden-
tifying each ground of difference we thereby distinguish that object from all others: 
“one has a fundamental Idea of an object if one thinks of it as the possessor of the 
fundamental ground of difference which it in fact possesses. (Such an Idea con-
stitutes, by definition, distinguishing knowledge of the object, since the object is 
differentiated from all other objects by this fact.)” (1982 p. 107) 
Grounds of difference for physical, spatio-temporal objects (the type of objects of 
concern here) will consist in identifying the spatio-temporal location of that object, as 
well as identifying the kind of object that it is. Thus, says Evans: “what differentiates a 
statue from every other thing at a time is given by citing (i) the position which it oc-
cupies at that time and (ii) the fact that it is a statue” (ibid.).10 It will be recalled from 
chapter one that an object was „individuated‟ by (broadly) distinguishing the bounda-
ries of certain property instances—i.e. distinguishing the place where snow ends and 
mud begins allows us to distinguish a patch of snow. Having identified these individu-
als we discern their spatial position (at time t) by the spatial relations they bear to 
other individuals around them. This location is sufficient to discriminate them from 
all other objects because no other object (of the same type) could simultaneously oc-
cupy the same position. Thus if I am in a position to discern (i) and (ii) for a (through 
what Evans calls an information-link with a) then I know which object it is because I 
can see that it is the only F-object which occupies that position—i.e. that relation to 
other property-instances. 
It is not necessary to have such a Fundamental Idea in order to satisfy a Know-
which condition and think about an object—for example, I can think of an object 
under the description „the greatest living philosopher‟ (assuming there can only be 
one) without knowing its spatial coordinates at the time of my thought. Yet Evans is 
keen to emphasise that thinking a thought about an object requires thinking of it as 
                                                     
10 Evans uses (i) and (ii) to avoid the apparent counterexample of how a statue and a lump of clay 
could occupy the same spatio-temporal position. 
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the type of object it is and therefore thinking of it as distinguished from other objects 
in certain fundamental ways. Thus when thinking of spatio-temporal objects (such as 
philosophers) in a non-fundamental way—i.e. without knowing their location—a sub-
ject must be aware of what a fundamental Idea of that object would be: “every 
thought not of this level is conceived to be made true by the truth of thoughts which 
are of this level” (1982 p. 112). For example, to think of „the greatest living philoso-
pher‟ without knowing his fundamental ground of difference at the time, I must con-
ceive that there is some object, somewhere, which is distinguished from all others by i) 
his spatial position at that time and ii) the fact that he is a person, and who satisfies the 
description given.  
Why might it be that thinking of an object requires conceiving of it as possessing 
some fundamental ground of difference (of objects of that type)? Again this seems en-
tailed by Evans‟ assumption that having a thought requires understanding that 
thought. We have seen that such understanding requires knowing what it is for my 
thought to be about a (and not another object). But, before I so discriminate a, I need 
to conceive of a as discriminable in the first place—i.e. I need to conceive of it as the 
sort of object which can be differentiated from others. All this gets us as far as sup-
posing that a has some kind of fundamental ground of difference—i.e. that some fact 
about a is such that knowing that fact would allow us to distinguish a from other ob-
jects of that sort (where „sort‟ is something as general as spatio-temporal). But if we 
think that a is a spatio-temporal object (as we might do when we use a description like 
„the greatest living philosopher‟) then we know what ground of difference it must pos-
sess—i.e. we know that it will be the only object of a certain sort occupying a certain 
spatio-temporal location.11 Thus all thoughts purportedly about physical objects must 
be thoughts about an object which is conceived to be discriminable in these funda-
mental ways. 
 
 
                                                     
11 Evans is not clear whether it is possible to be neutral as to the sort of object one picks out—i.e. 
spatio-temporal, abstract etc. Thus it is unclear whether that a description like „the prettiest thing‟—
which arguably might pick out a physical or abstract object—could issue in a thought about that thing, 
despite its fundamental type being unknown. 
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§2. 
Thus, for Evans, thought about a requires understanding what it would be for that 
thought to be true which, in turn, demands both that the subject is able to discrimi-
nate a and that they think of a as having some fundamental ground of difference—i.e. 
as an object which is discriminated in a certain way. To show why and how this gen-
erates an explicitly intellectualist condition on singular thought I will discuss its applica-
tion in one sphere of object-directed thought: demonstrative thought about objects 
which we are currently perceiving. Because such cases seemingly manifest a „direct‟ 
means of reference—i.e. an object can be represented in content specified by ‘that 
object’—they are perhaps the simplest way in which a subject might conceptually rep-
resent the world around them—as opposed to, say, thought which relies on linguistic 
capacities, such as description-based thought. As such the differences in their theories 
of demonstrative thought will reveal the deep disparity between Burge‟s theory of 
singular thought and that of the neo-Kantians. 
Demonstrative identification—i.e. sensible discrimination or perception of o—
affords discriminating knowledge because it puts us in a position to directly discern 
both (i) and (ii) (discussed in §1). However there is an ambiguity in what it is to dis-
cern (i)—i.e. in what it is for the subject to spatially locate the object. For Evans dis-
tinguishes between conceptual spatial thinking and a means of non-conceptual spatial location. 
The latter is what he calls location in „egocentric space‟ and location in objective or absolute 
space. While he sometimes speaks of them as two types of „Space‟ they are in fact two 
ways a subject has of identifying places in the same space, rather than a means of identi-
fying two different types of spatial-location (see also McDowell, 1990 p. 256).12 
To locate a place, p, egocentrically is to locate it in relation to oneself or one‟s body. 
The subject becomes the central figure in regard to which places are located by such 
phrases as „p is in front‟, „behind‟, „to the left‟ etc. (Evans, 1982 p. 153). As such 
egocentric locations reference only a subject‟s body. Such purely egocentric locations 
won‟t do for absolute, or objective location. To locate absolutely is to locate an object 
in such a way that it is related, not only to oneself at a given time, but to other objects 
and places at that time (i.e. simultaneously) (1982 p. 151). Consider this distinction with 
                                                     
12 As such use of terms like „absolute space‟ bear no relation to a notion of „absolute space‟ in the 
physical sciences. Rather they index a way the subject has of relating himself to his environment. 
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the following example: relating the kitchen and the bedroom in a house. Standing in 
the kitchen I can locate the bedroom egocentrically with the assertion „it is above‟, for 
it is true that the bedroom is above me at that time. However this sentence could also 
describe the absolute relation of the kitchen and bedroom; for it could assert that the 
bedroom is above the kitchen in a way which is independent of my position (it is true 
at t whether or not I am below the bedroom at t). Though I can, of course locate the 
bedroom egocentrically („the bedrom is above me‟) while simultaneously locating it 
absolutely—i.e. think that it bears a relation to other places independently of its 
relation to myself. 
Importantly, when I do conceive of p as located non-egocentrically I am able to 
locate it in a way which can index its relations to distinct, sometimes, unobserved 
places in the environment. Thus an „objective map‟ of an area is that which relates 
several places at one moment, independently of the subject‟s own position (ibid.). 
When its location is freed of its relation to me, the bedroom can also be located in 
relation to the bathroom, the hall landing or the house next door in a spatial network 
which also relates these things independently of their relation to the bedroom. Thus 
absolute location becomes a spatial network which can encompass all (at least 
physical) objects which could be the objects of  experience. Knowledge of an 
„objective map‟ or the spatial location of distinct places in a given area (at a given 
time) allows the subject to orientate himself in relation to a series of objects on the 
recognition of just one: 
“Someone who has a cognitive map of Oxford for example, must be able to 
contemplate the imposition of the map in the course of his travels (perhaps in a 
very dense fog). „If I am here, midway between Balliol and the Bodleian then that 
must be Trinity and so the High must be down there.‟” (1982 p. 162) 
In this way a subject is able to locate p egocentrically but impose his objective map 
upon that location to work out where he stands in relation to other places which he 
can‟t locate egocentrically. 
This is not to say that  subjects couldn‟t guide themselves, even in a complicated 
route, purely egocentrically. I might, for example, remember a route such that I know 
that if I keep X on my right and walk twenty paces I will see Y appear to my left. But, 
as Evans stresses, pure egocentric location is often a non-conceptual activity (1982 p. 
155); it is manifested merely in a subject‟s reaction to a given stimulus (e.g. my run-
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ning from a danger close to me) and even in more calculated activities (e.g. rats which 
could relocate a target in different conditions). Absolute location enables us to think, 
not just that Y will appear if I perform certain actions, but that, irrespective of my 
actions Y is related to X in a certain way. But this kind of spatial thinking is, as I will 
follow Evans in assuming, a cognitive, conceptual activity. It is not a mere reaction to 
immediate stimuli but a location of p within a stable environment which contains all 
other physical entities conceived to be in the world. Locating p in absolute space is 
thus, for Evans, manifesting a self-conscious understanding that the subject is able to 
move through a world which is related, largely independently of his own move-
ments—“he must have an idea of himself as one object among others” (1982 p. 163). 
It thus becomes a space in which both he and other subjects can identify places with a 
common spatial location, independent of their relation to any one subject at one time. As 
such, a conception of absolute space requires the capability for complex processing 
and conceptualisation which (so it is assumed here) is impossible for creatures who 
are cognitively less developed than adult humans. 
At this point we may want to question whether this dichotomy exhausts the con-
ceptions of space available to us. Perhaps, we might think, there is a third conception, 
somewhere between the two which might relate the kitchen to the bedroom, inde-
pendently of the subject‟s position, but without relating either room to other places—
i.e. the hall, the house next door etc. In this way the spatial relation between the 
kitchen and bedroom is isolated from their spatial relations to other objects. 
Such a conception seems perfectly coherent however what might be questioned 
is how far it reflects the way we actually think about spatially located objects. The 
claim that absolute space relates all objects in one spatial network need not mean that, 
for every object we locate within this network, we actively consider all of the relations 
it must bear to other objects; instead the only relation which may be salient to us (the 
only one we may actively consider) is its‟ relation to another object in the environment. 
However it does mean that we conceive of such objects as potentially related to other 
(perhaps currently unseen) objects and that such relations form a background to the 
object‟s conceived location. A conception of space which isolates the spatial relation of 
two (seen) objects precludes conceiving of such a background; to begin to do so 
would be to conceive of an object‟s spatial location in another way. But it is hard to 
see why we should ever need to conceive of objects in such isolation: it seems to bear 
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little relation to our means of navigating and it might be unclear why such a concep-
tion should be required. In what follows then I will largely ignore such alternative 
conceptions of space; not only do I take the absolute/egocentric distinction to ade-
quately describe our (normal) spatial conceptions, it is unclear why a third account 
should be adopted. 
With this distinction in mind it is necessary to ask which form of spatial location 
is required to identify the fundamental ground of difference of a (presently perceived) 
spatio-temporal object. Evans implies that, though one forms an Idea of o (a concep-
tion which satisfies the Generality Constraint) primarily through an egocentric form of 
location, its position in absolute space is still important: 
“One has an adequate Idea in virtue of the existence of an information-link be-
tween oneself and the object, which enables one to locate that object in egocen-
tric space. (That the Idea is adequate depends on one‟s ability to relate egocentric 
space to public space.)” (1982 p. 173) 
Recall that an Idea is a way or means of thinking of an object which satisfies Evans‟ 
know-which condition. Ostensibly it may seem that, at a certain time, t, the egocentric 
location of o is sufficient to enable us to identify its fundamental ground of difference 
and thus have an Idea of o: for no other entity of the same type could occupy the 
same spatial relation to my body at t. However Evans suggests that an „adequate Idea‟ 
depends upon orientating the egocentric location in terms of a position in absolute 
space, or on an „objective map‟. 
It is difficult to know exactly what Evans means by „adequate Idea‟. Though it 
suggests something about the sufficiency of an Idea—and thus the ability to think of 
o at all—he explicitly defines it as the ability to impose a conception of absolute space 
on the identification of a place in egocentric space—i.e. the ability to locate some-
thing as there (to my left) and also conceive of it as related to all other (spatial) objects 
(1982 p. 162 and p. 168). As such the „adequacy‟ of an Idea may not indict the 
sufficiency of egocentric location in enabling thought about o. However further 
comments suggest that Evans took this adequacy to be necessary to determine (i)—
i.e. o‟s spatio-temporal location—which could impact our ability to demonstratively 
identify and thus think about a spatio-temporal particular. In explaining why a current 
information-link enables identification he says: 
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“the subject will know, or will be able to discover, upon the basis of that 
[information-]link, where the object is. Given the subject‟s general knowledge of 
what makes propositions of the form π =p true, for arbitrary π [...] and given 
that he has located, or is able to locate, the object in his egocentric space, he can 
be said to know what it is for This=the object at π now to be true.” (1982 p. 
170) 
Here „p‟ is a position in egocentric space (ibid.) and „π‟ is a „fundamental‟ or „holistic‟ 
identification of a place (1982 p. 162)—in other words, for Evans, a position in 
absolute space, which can be related to all other positions in the same spatial network 
(1982 p. 151). What this passage then suggests is that an awareness of the object‟s 
relation to me (an egocentric location) must also be related to an absolute spatial 
framework in order to know what it is for o to be the demonstratively identified 
object. Thus it seems that absolute identification is required in order to enable object-
directed thought; indeed Evans expresses scepticism as to whether spatial location 
could be reduced merely o egeocentric location (1982 pp. 172-3). 
Evans is decidedly unclear on whether it would ever be possible to think about 
(or singularly represent) an object which was located purely egocentrically—i.e. solely 
in relation to myself, without conceiving of it as also related to other objects in an 
absolute spatial framework. However in the passage quoted and in the act of labelling 
an absolute location an „adequate Idea‟ he does seem keen to discourage us from 
thinking so. Indeed, if the conception of an egocentric location is interpreted a certain 
way, it seems we can provide an argument against the idea that we could ever think 
about an object located purely egocentrically. 
It should be borne in mind that, for Evans, an Idea of an object a requires two 
things: not only must we discriminate a from all other (spatio-temporal) particulars, 
we must be able to conceive of a as a particular of a certain type and a particular to be 
so discriminated in the first place—“[a]n Idea of an object is part of a conception of a 
world of such objects” (1982 p. 106). What this means is that in conceiving of a as a 
certain sort of particular—i.e. a spatio-temporal object—I must conceive of it as such 
that it could be distinguished from other (possible or actual) particulars of that type; 
any Idea of a must then be part of a conception of a world which could contain other 
objects like a but not identical to a. 
Pure egocentric location—i.e. a location which only relates o to the subject‟s body 
and does not also conceive of it within absolute space—is often described in a way 
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which ties it to behavioural output or subjective considerations. As Evans notes, per-
ception of a sound, or object can—in most cases—immediately allow us to discern 
where it is in relation to our bodies: when we hear a sound in a non-echoey or distort-
ing environment we do not calculate where, for example, we would have to turn to face 
the direction of the sound, rather such a reaction is immediate (1985 p. 383). Such 
direct apprehension of an object‟s egocentric location is possible, so Evans seems to 
suggest, because its (potential) affect on behaviour makes the spatial location a salient 
feature of an informational state: 
“the complex property of auditory input which codes the direction of sound, ac-
quires a spatial content for an organism by being linked with behavioural output in 
an advantageous way.” (1985 p. 385) 
However information states which are essentially tied to behaviour may not, necessar-
ily, transfer into thoughts which singularly represent physical objects. Such states are 
tied to behaviour at a given time, towards a certain stimulus; consequently they may 
only indicate an episodic or „passing acquaintance‟ with an object, and may not manifest 
the capacity to think of o in other thoughts, necessary to satisfy the Generality Con-
straint. In this way locating something there, and thinking of it only as the stimulus to 
action, need not require thinking of it as a discriminable object which possesses a cer-
tain fundamental ground of difference and which is thought of in a certain way. 
To understand what it might be to be in an information-state which could „go 
beyond‟ such a passing acquaintance we must examine Evans‟ idea of a Dispositional 
Connection to a place (understood here, as per chapter one, as a position in space dis-
tinguished by the presence of an object). We maintain such a connection when we 
recognise information from that place as bearing on the thoughts we have about it 
and the actions we perform (towards it). As Evans notes: 
“It is difficult to see how we could credit a subject with a thought about here if he 
did not appreciate the relevance of any perceptions he might have to the truth 
value and consequences of the thought, and did not recognise its implications for 
action. (consider, for instance, a thought like „There‟s a fire here‟).” (1982 pp. 
161-2) 
But, crucially, we can bear this kind of connection to a place (and, analogously, to-
wards an object) without maintaining a current information-link (perception). Evans‟ 
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example involves a subject who has placed a bottle of whiskey „beside his bed‟ and is 
still able to think of that place (and the whiskey) in the dark when, presumably, he has 
no perception of that object (ibid.). From this setup it may be unclear whether the 
subject is continuing to locate the object egocentrically—i.e. because he saw it there (to 
my left) he continues to think of it as there when he cannot see it. However the ele-
ment of darkness (let‟s say pitch-blackness) in this example means that it would be 
very easy for the subject to „lose track‟ of the egocentric direction of the bottle. De-
spite this, it seems he should be able to maintain a dispositional connection to this 
object—i.e. think about an object based on information he receives from it or the 
world; for example, if he hears the bedside table jar he should be able to think „I hope 
the whiskey is all right‟. 
Thus, while Evans‟ discussion is rather unclear on this point, his exposition of a 
dispositional connection, coupled with the point that an Idea of a requires conceiving 
of it as a discriminable particular, seems to imply that subjects should be able to reiden-
tify an object and place (as the same as one they perceived) after a period of non-
observation, without solely utilising its relation to their own bodies (because the sub-
ject could easily lose track of this but still must think of the bottle). He seems to re-
quire that the subject think of the object‟s spatial location as independent of its rela-
tion to them at a given time: only then can a subject conceive of the object as some-
thing which can persist irrespective of its relation to the subject. A system of spatial 
relations (e.g. between the whiskey and the bedside table) which is independent of the 
subject‟s location at any given t is what was called an absolute location: it requires think-
ing of the object as related to other objects, independently of a relation to the subject. 
(Given our conception of space, it further requires that all objects are thought to be 
related in a unified spatial framework.) 
It is this line of thought which reveals the possible limitations of a purely egocentric 
location of objects. A pure egocentric location is essentially connected to the subject‟s 
reaction to a stimulus in the environment, as such it manifests only a fleeting connec-
tion—a connection which lasts so long as the stimulus influences this episode of be-
haviour. But, as was revealed by Evans‟ discussion of a fundamental level of thought, 
understanding a thought like „o is F‟ requires, not merely understanding what makes a 
thought about an individual object, o, but requires conceiving of o as discriminable in 
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the first place. If conceived to be a physical object it must be thought to be dis-
criminable in certain fundamental ways. 
Conceiving of o as discriminable in these fundamental ways relates to chapter 
one where it was claimed that discreteness is an ineliminable part of our conception 
of physical objects. But another part of this conception is that objects are thought of 
as essentially distinct from a subject‟s experience of them—i.e. they could exist in the 
absence of such experience; as Evans puts it: “it is not thoughts about the experience 
which matter, but thoughts about the world” (1982 p. 158). But, given that it is tied to 
the reactions and needs of the subject it is not clear that mere egocentric location 
manifests an understanding of what it is for a thought „o is F‟ to be about an object. Un-
derstanding this requires understanding that a worldly object is distinct from a sub-
ject‟s reaction: one can only think of an object as something which can be the object 
of other (later) thoughts (of the same subject) if one understands that it is not essen-
tially tied to one‟s behaviour on a given occasion. 
Evans‟ discussion has thus revealed that an information-link can directly present 
the egocentric location of o, putting us in a position to discern its‟ fundamental 
ground of difference which enables thought about o as long as we can conceive of it as 
occupying a position in absolute space. But questions still remain. For one thing, 
while it‟s plausible that an information-link can „immediately‟ reveal o‟s egocentric lo-
cation with some accuracy it is hard to see how (or why) we should be able to discern 
o‟s location relative to all other objects. On this reading s could not think of o if he 
were lost and unable to relate it to other landmarks within a cognitive map (imagine, 
for example, if he came across o in the featureless arctic tundra encountered in chap-
ter one). A weaker reading, however, does not have this consequence, for it only re-
quires s to conceive of o as occupying a place—namely the place he can see that it oc-
cupies—in absolute space, even if he can‟t consciously relate that place to everything 
else; what is required is simply the awareness that o must be so related somehow and 
that a route could be traced from o to other landmarks in objective space. Such a con-
ception seems sufficient satisfy the requirements for an adequate Idea of o (thinking 
of o as an object and identifying the fundamental ground of difference). (Indeed it 
seems this is the reading Evans intends; see 1982 p. 172 and McDowell, 1990 p. 256.) 
A further question concerns the egocentric location of o. For there will be some 
cases where an information-link does not directly reveal its actual location; consider, 
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for example, if s sees o through distorting spectacles, or a thermal haze which causes o 
to be presented as 1m to the left of where it actually is (this example is from Pea-
cocke, 1991). Yet, as Peacocke notes, Evans does not require that an information-link 
present the actual location of o. Rather an information-link, in Evans‟ terms, should 
enable the subject to discern o‟s actual location, even if it doesn‟t always immediately 
reveal it (1982 p. 172). As Peacocke describes this: 
“The subject [...] can exploit his information-link with [o] by using his perceptual 
experience to guide him into a closer position where he does correctly locate o.” 
(1991 p. 125) 
However, we must be careful in understanding the role of information-links here for 
it is possible that this passage from Peacocke might underplay their significance. As it 
stands information-links provide a (potentially) indirect guide through which a subject 
can infer or navigate themselves to o‟s location. Yet Evans could well have thought 
that information-links were still a direct link to o—i.e. something which puts the sub-
ject in direct contact with o—and that such contact will (usually) be sufficient to dis-
cern o‟s location. Another reading of Peacocke, which might fit better with Evans, is 
that an information-link is like a beacon—or a direct pathway between s and o—
through which s is afforded an access which can directly influence his behaviour and 
information state in respect of this stimulus. Though perception of o may not simply 
reveal o‟s location the thought here is that this information-link will allow a subject to 
adapt their behaviour with respect to o—e.g. if o were on fire they would run away. A 
subject can locate o insofar as he is so aware of its presence that he could use the in-
formation-link to find o. 
Thus we can formulate a more specific requirement which, for Evans, must be 
met to demonstratively identify o and thereby fulfil the „know-which‟ requirement: 
(RP):   (For all objects o and all thinking subjects s) s can singularly represent o 
in demonstrative thought only if s is in a position to determine o‟s actual 
egocentric location and relate this to an absolute spatial network. 
„Being in a position to determine o‟s actual location‟ means having a „suitable‟ infor-
mation-link with o: an information-link which can act to afford knowledge of o‟s ac-
tual location. An information-link affords this when subjects can use it to guide them-
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selves to o; in this way it acts as a „beacon‟ or path (though, as chapter three will show, 
not all information-links act in this way). (RP) is restricted to demonstrative thought—
thought about objects one is perceiving, or is remembering having perceived. In this 
way it is only a variant of the more general requirement of Russell‟s Principle and 
does not govern, say, a discrimination of an object via a description. 
Given (RP) and the discussion of this section we are now in a position to define 
the intellectualism which can be reasonably attributed to both Strawson and Evans. 
As Evans‟ discussion has shown, demonstrative thought about an object requires 
conceiving of it as within absolute space. Further, when we recall Strawson‟s discus-
sion—that non-demonstrative identification of an object requires (spatially) relating it 
to an object one can demonstratively identify—this too seems to depend on relating 
both (currently) observed and unobserved objects in one spatial framework. Thus 
though Strawson does not provide as extensive a discussion as Evans‟ on demonstra-
tive identification, we can assume that he too would require subjects to conceive of 
objects as within absolute space. 
§3. 
This, neo-Kantian, conception clearly requires highly advanced cognitive capacities: 
not only to understand what it is for an object to exist in absolute space, but what it is 
for a thought to be „true‟. Such capacities are thought to be possessed only by devel-
oped human beings and not, say „lower‟ animals like apes or less developed humans 
like infants. It is here where a clear conflict arises with Burge who is happy even to 
assume that such subjects enjoy singular thought (2003 p. 519), (2010a p. 162). 
The first question to be pursued in outlining Burge‟s theory is how he is able to 
make this assumption in his theory of singular thought. It should be clarified that 
Burge does agree that thoughts are essentially conceptual: not only does he claim that 
attribution of thought requires “a capacity for inference—for truth-preserving pro-
positional transitions” (ibid.) which are taken to be conceptual activities, but he ac-
cepts that they can be propositionally structured, a composition he explicitly reserves 
for conceptual content (2010a. p. 36). Further he does not conceive of thought as 
subpersonal, or modular, rather it is an activity of the whole individual (2003 p. 519). 
In attributing thought to animals Burge is thus claiming that such creatures are capa-
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ble of holding conceptual, propositional attitudes towards objects in their environ-
ments. Since the most intuitive cases of this will be those where the object of their 
thought is one which they currently perceive I will continue to phrase the discussion 
in terms of demonstrative thought. 
Burge‟s theory of perception clearly influences his thought that animals can be 
attributed demonstrative thoughts. Because singular representation occurs in non-
conceptual perceptual content he claims that singular referring thoughts can be pos-
ited (for those creatures capable of thought) providing such representation is thought 
to be preserved between the two mental processes. As he describes it: 
“The most salient aspects of this element in the transition [from perception to 
thought] is the association of concepts with perceptual classifications and the as-
sociation of demonstrative elements in the propositional representation with 
some of the singular, context-dependent elements in the perceptual representa-
tion. When the transition goes well, singular reference is preserved[.]” (2003 p. 
541) 
With this theory Burge is not only claiming that we can preserve all or most of the 
information encoded in a perceptual experience, he is also claiming that we can pre-
serve its representational features, specifically the object that perception represents. In 
chapter one it was seen that Burge‟s theory of perceptual content claims that there is a 
context-bound singular element, anti-individualistically determined by causal interac-
tion with a particular object in the world. If singular elements are preserved in a tran-
sition from perception to thought then the object which causes the (singular) percep-
tual content will be the object the thought is about since it will determine the singular 
element of thought-content. As such Burge claims that the representational contents 
of thought (but, importantly, not the states) will differ depending on whether the ob-
ject which causes the perception (and thus thought) is a real object (say, a real tomato) 
or a fake (2005 p. 34). Thought about in this way it is tempting to read Burge‟s theory 
of thought as an extension of his anti-individualist theory of content-determination: 
the content of a belief is constitutively determined by causal contact with the external 
environment. 
In this way Burge propounds a species of a view called the Photograph Model 
which Evans opposes. This is a type of theory of thought-attribution in which “the 
causal antecedents of the information involved in a mental state [...] are claimed to be 
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sufficient to determine which object the state concerns” (1982 p. 78). For example say 
I perceive one tomato, a, at place p, time t1; then, at a later time t2, I perceive an indis-
tinguishable tomato, b, also at p. Now imagine that I lose my memory of the first to-
mato meaning that when I think back and come to believe ‘that tomato I saw was red’ the 
information in the memory derives solely from b.13 According to Evans the subject is 
in no position to distinguish between the two tomatoes and thus would not know 
what it is for his thought to be about b rather than a—thus, he could not be said to 
have a referential thought. However, the Photograph Model—and Burge‟s theory—
would conclude that, since the information (memory) is derived from b and since this 
causes the ensuing thought—about ‘that tomato I saw’—the thought can be said to „be 
about‟ or singularly represent the relevant object. 
It might be thought that Evans‟ theory of informational content (under which 
the informational content of the perceptions would be the same Tx) influences his 
response. Were he to adopt Burge‟s view he would admit that the singular aspect of 
the perceptual content would be different in each case—it would represent the to-
mato which caused it: Ta or Tb. On this view he may still deny that the subject is in any 
position to distinguish between the two tomatoes, but he may find it harder to claim 
that the subject is in no position to think of the tomato on which his memory is 
based. If my memory represents b then it might be thought right to say I should be able 
to think of b—that the singular elements „transfer‟ between mental representations. 
But Evans‟ actual objection to the Photograph model does not invoke this 
model of informational content. He claims we cannot think of b here because, admit-
ting that a causal link is sufficient to enable object-directed thought “subverts the very 
logic or grammar of the concept of knowing what it is for it to be true [that b is red]” 
(1982 p. 116). What he means is that, in being unable to identify anything which 
would distinguish b from a, I cannot be thought to have the capacity to discriminate it 
from all other things. Though I can distinguish b from everything not at p at the time 
I remember seeing it, I have no information which will distinguish it from the indis-
criminable a, seen previously. As such I cannot be said to have an Idea of b, based on 
this memory—i.e. this memory does not provide a means of thinking about it in in-
definitely many thoughts. But if I am unable to discriminate in this way then, claims 
                                                     
13 This case is structurally identical to Evans‟ Baker-case (1982 p. 78) and the two, indistinguishable 
steel balls (1982 p. 90). 
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Evans, I cannot know what it is for my thought ‘that tomato was red’ to be true for I do 
not know which individual would have to be red. 
This objection obtains whatever theory of content we adopt; what is essential to 
it is Evans‟ central assumption—that to have a thought a subject must understand 
what it is for that thought to be true. It is this assumption which underpins Evans‟ 
theory of singular thought, not his conception of informational content. Perhaps Ev-
ans thought that an open sentence structure was sufficient to perform the psychologi-
cal explanations required and saw no reason to enhance it. But, if Burge can provide 
independent motivation for his theory of perception, Evans seems perfectly able to 
adapt to this yet still oppose the Photograph Model when it comes to singular 
thought: even if perception singularly represents there is no further motivation to say 
that this singular element is preserved between representations—especially if Evans 
maintains his central assumption. 
We are now in a position to answer the question which initiated this chapter: 
does a defence of Strawson and Evans‟ intellectualist theories of mental representa-
tion (or a theory based upon them) require defending the principle (BI)? If Strawson‟s 
discussion of perception is interpreted a certain way, and if Evans‟ account of infor-
mational content is to be defended to the letter then (BI) must be upheld. However 
this chapter has shown that it is difficult to discern the wider significance of (BI) in 
other aspects of Evans‟ (or Strawson‟s) theory of mental representation—i.e. its im-
pact on their theories of singular thought. Not only does this theory of thought seem 
to come into genuine conflict with Burge‟s own, it also seems that it could incorpo-
rate the main points of his theory of perception at the expense of (BI). Thus it does 
not seem that neo-Kantian intellectualism should be dismissed because Evans com-
mits to (BI); nor does it seem that a defence of a specifically „neo-Kantian intellectual-
ism‟ need wed itself to upholding (BI). Despite Evans‟ endorsement this commitment 
seems disposable and, if Burge is to be believed, ultimately problematic. 
Consequently to defend neo-Kantian intellectualism, I will not seek to defend a 
commitment to (BI): it seems such a commitment could be relinquished in the face of 
Burge‟s theory of perception while a conflicting theory of singular thought could be 
maintained, based on Evans‟ assumption that having a thought requires understand-
ing what it would be for that to be true. 
The neo-Kantian principle which I will now look to defend concerns the condi-
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tions both Strawson and Evans place on having thought about a particular object. As 
§2 showed, Evans believed that thinking of an object requires locating it within „abso-
lute space‟—a form of location assumed to require reasonably advanced cognitive 
capacities. If objects are conceived to be spatially related to other objects, independ-
ently of their relation to the subject (indeed, if the subject is conceived to be one ob-
ject among others, 1982 p. 176), then it is clear that the subject must be capable of 
thinking of the world as somewhat distinct and independent of his own relation to it. 
Thus it might be possible to formulate a principle which characterises neo-Kantian 
intellectualism like (BI) only restricted to representation in conceptual thought. The 
principle, which I will call Narrow Intellectualism (NI), can be put as follows: 
(NI):     (For all physical objects, o, and all thinking subjects s) S cannot repre-
sent o in conceptual thought unless he can conceive of o as a discrete 
particular existing independently of his experience. 
However, although there is manifestly a link between conceiving of o as independent 
of my experience and being able to locate o within an absolute spatial framework, a 
more exact formulation of (NI) can be developed: 
(NI*):     (For all objects o and all thinking subjects s) s can singularly represent o 
in thought only if s conceives of o as located in an „absolute‟ spatial 
network. 
This latter formulation is what I take to be the canonical formulation of the intellec-
tualist principle common to Strawson and Evans. Like (BI) this is an intellectualist 
principle because it is assumed that conceiving of objects as within a unified spatial 
network requires advanced cognitive capacities. However, unlike (BI) this principle 
does not extend to all mental representation of o, but only to conceptual thought which 
singularly represents o; as such (NI) need not conflict with Burge‟s theory of percep-
tion. 
The assumption which leads Evans to adopt (RP) and, ultimately, (NI*) is the 
idea that, to have a thought, subjects must understand what it is for that thought to be 
true. Evans took this assumption to be a deeply intuitive claim which nobody would 
wish to deny. However it is clear that, in adopting a version of the Photograph Model 
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Burge is rejecting such an assumption: for him, a subject entertaining representational 
content which singularly represents a particular object need not understand what it 
would be for that thought to be true. In consequence he needn‟t claim, like Evans, 
that a subject must conceive of objects as objective or located in absolute space in 
order to entertain thought about them. As such he can deny that entertaining singular 
thought requires possessing advanced cognitive capacities which only adult humans 
are thought to possess. His view can be expressed in the following principle, Anti-
Intellectualism (AI): 
(AI):   To entertain singular thought about o a subject must have the basic ca-
pacity to employ conceptual attributives, however such an ability does 
not require the possession of advanced intellectual capacities. 
Given that conceiving of objects in absolute space is assumed to require advanced 
cognitive capacities (AI) is clearly incompatible with (NI*). Burge is able to commit to 
an anti-intellectualism because he rejects Evans‟ central assumption that a subject‟s 
having a thought entails that they understand what it would be for that thought to be 
true. In the next chapter I will examine objections to this assumption—and Evans‟ 
ensuing commitment to (RP)—to see whether (NI*) can stand up to the challenge 
posed by (AI). 
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3 
The question which I will now pursue is whether Burge‟s anti-intellectualism regard-
ing object-directed thought provides a significant challenge to a distinctly „neo-
Kantian‟ intellectualism, defined as (NI*). More specifically we might ask whether 
there is anything to be gained from maintaining an interest in Strawson‟s and Evans‟ 
discussions of mental representation in the light of Burge‟s rival theory and objec-
tions. 
The next chapter will be concerned with Burge‟s specific reasons for rejecting in-
tellectualist theories and preferring (AI). In this chapter however I will address a more 
general concern with Strawson‟s and Evans‟ views of singular thought: the idea that 
(RP) is far too demanding as a constraint on this kind of representation. Just as Burge 
thought it a disadvantage that Strawson and Evans seemed to commit to (BI), it may 
be thought impossible to defend (NI*) if it requires a commitment to Russell‟s Prin-
ciple.  Thus we might wonder whether, if (RP) must be abandoned, Evans‟ and 
Strawson‟s accounts immediately lose their interest and Burge loses his neo-Kantian 
rival.  
In §1 I‟ll examine a cogent counterexample to Russell’s Principle and explain why it 
seems to show it to be too strong. In §2 I‟ll outline and endorse a weakening of the 
neo-Kantian view explored in Peacocke (1983) which avoids the counterexample dis-
cussed. To close, §3, I‟ll explain why this weakened version retains many of the con-
cerns which the previous two chapters have shown to be central to the discussions of 
both Strawson and Evans. In retaining this focus, I‟ll claim, even a non-(RP) account 
of singular thought can be considered a distinctly neo-Kantian theory. 
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§1. 
It was seen in chapter two that Evans‟ commitment to Russell‟s Principle can be op-
posed by a theory which, like Burge‟s, claims that a perceptual relation to an object, o, 
is sufficient—in the absence of a capacity to discriminate o—to enable thought about 
o. Here I will discuss a case from Peacocke which lends weight to such a view: 
“we can imagine at some fairground stand an apple, seen in a mirror which is 
amongst various other moving mirrors: the set-up may be so complicated that it 
is beyond the subject to locate that apple in egocentric space. But it seems he can 
still think about it, wonder where it is now and so forth. It is true that [...] the 
presented object has an (approximate) apparent location, or at least direction, in 
egocentric space: but this can hardly suffice to fulfil the requirement of knowl-
edge, or the ability to attain it, which Evans gave.” (1983 p. 171) 
Because of the disorientating effect of the moving mirrors there is an understanding 
of this case in which the subject (call him s) cannot discern the spatial location of the 
apple—i.e. the information-link with the apple does not put s in a position to deter-
mine the apple‟s location, as (RP) demands. 
As Peacocke notes, this must be handled with care: for the subject‟s ability to 
trace a route to o (his „being in a position‟ to do so) using this information-link de-
pends, in some degree, upon his understanding of the mechanism by which o is pre-
sented to him. Evans claims that we can demonstratively refer to a man we hear on 
the radio or see on the TV because, even though this information-link does not reveal 
his actual location, a (broad) understanding of the mechanism involved allows us to 
discern that some object (located somewhere, at least one time)14 is causally responsi-
ble for the information-link (1982 p. 149). However, where this broad understanding 
of the mechanism is lacking (or is incorrect)—where, for example, s thinks the man is 
inside the radio or TV—the information-link does not put s in a position to discern o‟s 
location: the information-link, combined with s‟s poor understanding of the mecha-
nism, will lead s to trace a route to a location where o is not to be found (1982 p. 150). 
Plausibly (RP) does not apply to the cases of radio and TV (because those medi-
ums may never put us in a position to discern o‟s egocentric location); however Ev-
                                                     
14 Recall that, though Evans does not think we have to know an object‟s Fundamental Ground of dif-
ference, we do have to conceive of it as possessing one. 
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ans‟ treatment of them does provide a means to understand how the Apple-case 
could contravene (RP). As Peacocke says, if s is not aware that he is seeing a reflection 
of o then this information-link, combined with his poor understanding of the mecha-
nism by which it is presented, will lead s to trace a route to a location where o is not to 
be found—i.e. a mirror (Peacocke, 1991 p. 125 footnote 2). Far from putting s in a 
position to discern o’s actual egocentric location, this information-link can only put s 
in a position to wrongly locate o (due to his poor understanding of the mechanism). 
Nonetheless it is still possible to maintain that this confused s is still able to enjoy 
thought about o. Perhaps Evans could concede that it will seem to s just as if he enjoys 
thought about some o, or that it would be natural to describe s as doing so (1982 p. 90); 
however he may object that this thought is illusory15 or this „natural description‟ is 
misleading. What we need then is some reason to say that s‟s thought genuinely 
represents o and cannot be based on an illusion or loose talk. 
One reason to deny these Evansian responses is that, plausibly, s could be said to 
be in a position to know something about o—e.g. that it is a green apple. 16 In many 
cases it is intuitive to say that s’s having seen o is sufficient to explain his knowledge 
about o: it is a source of access which (reliably) reveals information about o that would 
allow him to, for example, track the truth of a belief about o through relevant possible 
worlds. In this case, despite s only seeing a reflection of o (and his ignorance of this), 
it is plausible to think that this information-link still affords sufficient access for 
knowledge about o; for example, it allows him to track the truth of beliefs—were o 
red he would not believe that o is green etc. 
Since we might think that knowledge about o requires genuine (and not illusory) 
belief about o this intuition may lead us to dispute the Evansian claim that s cannot 
think about o in this case. Allowing that s knows about o thus contravenes (RP) and a 
commitment to Russell‟s Principle. Of course Evans would object that accepting this 
intuition (that s is in a position to know) and allowing this counterexample means de-
nying that, in order to have a thought, a subject must know what it is for his thought 
to be true. Since he cannot discriminate o (because he is not in a position to discern its 
                                                     
15 Thereby denying the transparency of mental states (see McDowell, 1986). 
16 This point was inspired by an unpublished discussion from Dr. Rory Madden in which he claims 
that the attribution of reference to a subject should put them in a position to know something about the 
object. 
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actual location) he does not know which object must be green in order for his 
thought ‘o is green’ to be true. 
Evans clearly believed that this consequence would deter people from accepting 
such counterexamples, yet it is unclear to me that this consideration should prevent 
us from saying that s is in a position to know something about o. It seems to tally well 
with our understanding of what affords knowledge about the world that s‟s informa-
tion-link with o (despite his ignorance that he sees a reflection) allows him to know—
and therefore genuinely believe—that o is green and not red. Evans‟ clear endorse-
ment of the requirement that a subject must understand what it would be for their 
thought to be true seems insufficient to dispel this strong intuition of s‟s knowledge. 
In the absence of a theoretical motivation for Evans‟ condition it becomes un-
clear why we should favour (RP) over a less complex explanation: that s saw o and 
that such perceptual contact is (often, at least) sufficient to put s in a position to en-
tertain thought about o. Such an account would dispense with the idea that s had to 
(have the capacity to) discriminate o from all other objects and, as such, would aban-
don Russell‟s Principle and (RP). My point here is that this simple, causal account is 
prima facie preferable to Russell‟s Principle and is not something to which Evans‟ dis-
cussion can offer a feasible reply. 
§2. 
The cogency of this counterexample shows that Evans‟ central assumption (that s 
should understand what it would be for his thought to be true) is not a self-evident 
truth and, therefore, that a commitment to a „know-which‟ condition is not contained 
within our conception of what it is to have an object-directed thought. Rather this 
counterexample suggests that an (appropriate) psychological link with o—e.g. percep-
tion of o—is sufficient to enable thought about o even though the subject does not 
possess discriminating knowledge. However it would be premature to think that this 
shows the truth of (AI) over an intellectualist account of singular thought—i.e. an 
account which claims that subjects must possess advanced cognitive capacities if they 
are to entertain singular thought. One consideration in favour of this, as I will show 
in this section, is that this „causal‟ account is compatible with such an intellectualist 
account. 
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Recall that Evans believed any thought about an object had to conceive of that 
object as discriminable in certain fundamental ways—i.e. as possessing a fundamental 
ground of difference appropriate to an object of that type. Thus any thought about a 
spatio-temporal object must conceive of it as being the only object of a certain sort 
(e.g. a statue) occupying a spatio-temporal position. Importantly this doesn‟t mean 
that a subject should, consciously, entertain a thought of the form „o is distinguished 
from everything else by fact-x‟; after all, when I look at a perceptually presented apple 
I don‟t consciously think that there is some feature which will discriminate it from all 
other apples, nor do I think that I must be aware of this in order to entertain thoughts 
about it. Rather Evans‟ point was only that, as I come to understand what it would be 
for my thought to be true I thereby come to understand what would make o dis-
criminable in the first place. Crucially, as was clear in the previous chapter, Evans did 
not think this was an explicitly conscious mental exercise: it was simply part of the men-
tal process which determined that content represents an object in the first place. It is 
part of our conception of an object—and therefore our understanding an object-
directed thought—that it is a discrete particular distinguished in certain, fundamental 
ways. 
Clearly, for Evans, this was connected to his—now discredited—assumption 
that having a thought required understanding what it would be for that thought to be 
true. Though it is denied that singularly representing o requires knowing what it would 
be for that thought to be about o (entailed by Evans‟ assumption), other elements of 
Evans‟ picture can still be maintained. Perhaps it is true that s is not able to discrimi-
nate o from all other things however he may yet be able to understand that his 
thought is about a certain type of object—e.g. a spatio-temporal, physical object—
and, in having this minimal understanding, will understand what it is for there to be 
such an object in the first place—i.e. he will conceive of that object (the object of his 
thought or which he even believes to exist) as discriminable in certain, fundamental 
ways. As Peacocke attests: 
“In examples in which a thinker is perceptually presented with an object but is 
unable to locate it in either egocentric or public space, he must still suppose that 
it has some fundamental identification. To come to believe it has none is to 
come to believe that there is no such presented object.” (1983 p. 173) 
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The claim here is that, while s does not have to understand what it is for his thought 
to be about o (and not another object), he does have to understand what it is for his 
thought to be about a (broad) type of object. Evans‟ own discussion of the „fundamen-
tal level of thought‟ was explicitly concerned with the broad category of spatio-
temporal objects (though there will be fundamental grounds of difference for any 
kind of object, like colours and numbers); what this account requires is that, to have 
an object-directed thought—a thought which singularly represents the worldly object 
they perceive—a subject must understand what it is for their thought to be about such 
an object in the first place. As the discussions of the previous two chapters have 
shown, conceiving of worldly objects plausibly requires conceiving of them as dis-
crete, propertied particulars which exist independently of a subject‟s experience of 
them. Thus, on this view, having a thought about a worldly object requires conceiving 
of them as discrete—and therefore distinguishable in certain fundamental ways—as 
well as independent of experience. 
Such an account wouldn‟t necessarily reduce to Burge‟s anti-individualist view 
that this causal contact is sufficient to constitutively determine s‟s thought-content 
such that it singularly represents o. For even though we may deny Evans‟ more strin-
gent conditions on singular thought, we could still demand that object-directed 
thought manifest a deep level of understanding and a consciousness of mind‟s rela-
tion to world which Burge‟s theory ignores. Contra Evans this weakened intellectualist 
account would claim that subjects do not need to know which object their thought 
concerns—i.e. would not need to discriminate it from all others—and therefore do 
not have to meet his stringent condition that they know what it would be for their 
thoughts to be true. However, contra Burge such an intellectualism would claim that a 
subject only has the capacity to think about an object with which they are perceptually 
related when they are (broadly) capable of understanding object-directed thought. 
An account of this type would be compatible with the claim that a suitable causal 
relation to o—such as seeing o—can be sufficient to enable thought about o: such a 
relation makes a subject aware of o which he is able to think about only if he under-
stands o to be a discrete object distinct from his own experience. However, one obvi-
ous objection at this point is that this intellectualist requirement destroys some of the 
simplicity and intuitiveness of the causal story: after all, when you ask anyone (from a 
developed human adult to a linguistic child) how they are thinking about o the explana-
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tion (if there is one) is unlikely to include reference to a capacity to discriminate be-
tween „objects and subjective sensations‟ and „an awareness of o as a discrete and dis-
criminable individual‟. Such a fact might be taken as a basis on which to reject the 
intellectualist demand that thought about o manifests an understanding of what it is 
for a thought to be about an object. 
However this would by a rather myopic appraisal. What might tempt us to say 
that these subjects think about o but don’t manifest an understanding of what it is to 
be an object is the fact that they don‟t feel it necessary to explain what an object is, or 
why their thought is about that and not a sensation (see chapter one). Yet, such an 
objection is flawed: it seems right to say that an ability to explain, say, the meaning of 
a proposition p manifests an understanding of p, but just because the desired explana-
tion of what makes o an object is not forthcoming—or is not commonsensical—does 
not mean that subjects are unable, or that such an understanding is redundant in their 
having a thought about o. What Evans‟ insight makes clear is that we do not have to 
consciously inform ourselves that „o is discriminable from all other things‟; rather, his 
point was that thought about o necessarily manifests a latent understanding of what 
makes o an object—i.e. that it is discriminable. Similarly this view claims that thought 
about o will manifest, not just the latent understanding that o is a discrete (and there-
fore discriminable) particular, but that o is independent of experience—a similarly deep-
seated commitment in our conception of objects if Strawson‟s analysis (given in ch.1 
§1) is to be believed. The point is that, if they enjoy object-directed thought, a subject 
will—„on some level‟—be able to answer the question „what makes your thought 
about o and not your subjective sensation of o-ness?‟; to do so will mean appealing to 
the notions of discreteness and independence which chapter one showed were con-
sidered (by Strawson) integral to our conception of worldly objects. 
However this account could be subject to the following regress objection: 
1.     To understand „o is F‟ s must know what it would be for the world to con-
tain an object, o. 
2.      To know what it would be for the world to contain an object o, s must 
understand the conditions for something being an object. 
3.      To understand the conditions for something being an object s must un-
derstand the conditions for the conditions of understanding something‟s 
being an object. 
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4.     To understand the conditions of the conditions for understanding some-
thing‟s being an object s must understand the conditions for the condi-
tions for the conditions of understanding something‟s being an object 
etc. 
Both (1) and (2) must be admitted by this new intellectualist theory: (1) states the re-
quirement that s must understand what it is for the world to contain some object 
which is F if he is to have the thought „o is F‟ and (2) expresses the resulting claim (as 
per the discussion of Evans in chapter two) that understanding such a thought is un-
derstanding the conditions something must meet if it is to be an object—i.e. being 
distinct from a subject‟s experiences, reidentifiable etc. Thus it seems right to say that 
if a subject must understand what it would be for the world to contain an object 
which is F he must understand what makes something an object. The regress is gener-
ated by allowing that (3) follows from (2). What this suggests is that, to understand 
what it is for something to be an object s must understand what it is to understand 
that something is an object. If (3) follows from (2) then (4) must follow from (3) and 
a regress ensues. 
However there seems little reason to grant that (3) follows from (2). It seems 
perfectly coherent to say that a subject understands something—or indeed that it is a 
condition of his entertaining, say, a thought or proposition that he understands—
without thereby admitting that he understands the conditions on his understanding. A 
subject can understand a proposition (e.g. successfully use it (as intended) in commu-
nication) by knowing what each of the terms mean, and how they fit in a syntactic 
structure, but he does not have to know this in order to understand (and successfully 
utilise) the proposition: he merely has to use it in the way he does! Likewise a subject 
who understands his thought in the sense under discussion must understand what 
makes something an object—and therefore what would make his object-directed 
thought true of the world—however he would not have to understand how he under-
stands. Just as the language-user can be said to understand the proposition he em-
ploys without „understanding how it is he understands‟, a thinker can understand his 
thought without having to understand how he understands. By rejecting this (rather 
absurd) premise we can avoid the regress whilst maintaining the weakened intellec-
tualist theory. 
The fact that a different intellectualist theory (indeed, a weakened version of Ev-
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ans‟ account) is compatible with the causal-account discussed in §1 perhaps shows 
that a rejection of (RP) is rather inconclusive in settling the debate between intellec-
tualist and anti-intellectualist accounts. Instead I propose to turn to that question in 
the following chapter. But I will close this one by showing that, despite the rejection 
of (RP), the question of whether neo-Kantian intellectualism can be defended is still a 
live one. 
§3. 
This suggestion of a new intellectualist theory claims that, though they do not need a 
capacity to discriminate o, subjects do have to understand what it would be for their 
thought to be about an object in the first place—i.e. to think Fa they must know what 
it would be for there to be an object (if not specifically a) which is F. It was claimed 
that this requires subjects to conceive of objects as, not only discrete particulars, but 
as independent of their experience of them: as chapter one claimed, these are two, 
ineliminable features of our conception of objects (at least the objects we conceive to 
exist in the physical world). 
In that chapter it was also suggested that a distinction can be made between two 
forms of description of experience (or, in this case, of thought). So-called „sensation-
speak‟ described an encounter with an object using merely general features like 
„roundness and redness‟ (to describe a red ball), without mentioning the discriminable 
object itself. Conversely object-directed descriptions essentially make reference to 
such a particular and, it was claimed, can be understood only when the subject can 
conceive of that object as distinct from themselves—only then can it be a discrete, 
independent object. Thus in elucidating what it is for a subject to understand object-
directed thought we might think it necessary that they be able to discern the differ-
ence between these two types of description of thought—i.e. they should know the 
difference between an object-directed characterisation (which singularly represents o) 
and non-object-directed characterisation (which does not). 
As was seen in the previous chapter, Evans thought that the mark of object-
involving thought cannot be spelled out in purely egocentric terms. As defined, ego-
centric location is made in terms of the (spatial) relation of an object to a subject‟s 
own body. While this can be in tandem with an absolute location—i.e. we can think 
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of an object both as located relative to ourselves and as related to all other physical 
objects—a purely egocentric location, according to Evans, does not manifest an un-
derstanding of object-involving thought. Importantly Evans‟ point can be construed, 
not just as applying to his own Russell‟s Principle, but to the distinction between „o is 
green‟ and „there is greenness‟—a distinction even the weakened intellectualist theory 
requires subjects to understand. 
States which located a stimulus purely egocentrically were seen to be tied to behav-
iour: a subject‟s response to a stimulus on a given occasion. As such they were taken 
to manifest a merely episodic connection to the source of the stimulation—the ob-
ject—because they were essentially tied to a subject‟s position and reaction at one 
given time. To have experience which manifests an understanding of what it is for the 
thought „o is F‟ to be an object-directed thought subjects need to understand what it is 
for the world to contain an object rather than a sensation which has an episodic affect on 
behaviour. The difference here is taken to lie in the fact that an object is distinct from 
the subject in that its‟ existence is not dependent on the subject‟s experience of it and 
(as we conceive of it at least) it can persist outside of observation (see chapter one). To 
manifest such an understanding subjects must have a „dispositional connection‟: an 
ability to think of objects in the absence of (current) information-links with that ob-
ject. 
Such a distinction can be applied to the need to distinguish between „o is green‟ 
and „there is greenness‟. Object-directed thought can be distinguished precisely by the 
fact that, in having this thought, a subject implicitly understands what it is for the 
world to contain an object as something which can persist outside of one experience. 
In this way he can have a dispositional connection since, in distinguishing the object 
from one experience of it, he is able to think of it even in the absence of a (current) 
information-link. As chapter two makes clear, this requires locating o in a way which 
extends beyond its‟ relation to a subject at a given time and thus requires locating it in 
an absolute spatial framework. 
Consequently, thinking along lines inspired by Strawson and Evans, attributing 
the thought „o is green‟ to a subject is implicitly attributing the ability to think of that 
object in abstraction from his own relation to it. In so doing we are attributing the 
ability to conceive of that object as located in an absolute spatial network—exactly 
the same general principle (NI*) which was entailed by (RP). 
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This should make clear that the possibility of a new intellectualist position still 
retains some of the main features of Strawson‟s and Evans‟ discussions. In chapter 
one it was seen that both Strawson and Evans seemed concerned with a certain con-
scious experience in which objective, discrete entities (physical objects) were the es-
sential constituents. Though it was left reasonably obscure what such a consciousness 
might really amount to, this thesis (labelled (PT)) was seen to require intensive con-
ceptual capabilities, including the ability to conceive of objects as independent of ex-
perience. In chapter two it was shown that both Strawson and Evans seemed to think 
these capabilities underlined singular thought. Such thought, they believed, was im-
possible for creatures who were not conscious of the distinction between their ex-
perience and the world (or objects) of that experience. 
Though we have rejected a seemingly central feature of their views on singular 
thought—Russell‟s Principle—the weakened intellectualism outlined here has pre-
served this concern with what might be called „objective thought‟. It agrees with 
Strawson and Evans that thought manifests a deep understanding of mind‟s relation 
to world. Consequently it might be claimed that the account discussed here preserves 
one of the primary concerns of both Strawson and Evans: how a subject‟s conception 
of themselves as a perspective on an objective world influences and distinguishes 
their mental life (and content). 
My goal here has not necessarily been to motivate endorsement of this intellec-
tualist view; indeed, it is not the goal of this thesis to determine whether or not such 
an account is correct. What I have attempted to show is that this view is (prima facie) 
a coherent and defensible account of singular thought. This is sufficient to show that 
a specifically neo-Kantian intellectualism—an intellectualism based on the discussion 
of Strawson and Evans—is a tenable position even when divorced from a commit-
ment to Russell‟s Principle. 
For the rest of this thesis then I will assume that the account discussed in §2 is at 
least a prima facie viable account of singular thought which entails a distinctive neo-
Kantian principle: Narrow Intellectualism. The mere rejection of Russell‟s Principle, 
and the considerations which prompted it, have not been sufficient to either establish 
Burge‟s preferred theory or to show neo-Kantianism to be wholly defunct. The ques-
tion which I will pursue in the next chapter, and which will conclude the thesis, is 
whether Burge can offer any conclusive consideration in favour of abandoning (NI*).
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4 
The situation so far is the following: chapter one showed that Burge‟s objection to the 
neo-Kantians—that they „hyperintellectualised‟ perception—could not dispel a resur-
gence of a „neo-Kantian intellectualism‟; the reason for this was that an intellectualism 
could be developed which accepted Burge‟s theory of perception (and rejected Evans‟ 
account of informational content) but conflicted with his (Burge‟s) account of singu-
lar thought. Importantly, while Burge claims that, to enjoy singular thought, subjects 
only need to employ conceptual attributives in a singular representation (a capacity 
which he thinks can be attributed to „lower‟ animals like apes) a neo-Kantian theory, 
defined by (NI*), stipulates that subjects require more advanced cognitive capacities, 
such as the capacity to locate objects in absolute space. 
In this chapter I will examine Burge‟s general objections to intellectualism and 
seek to determine whether they pose any problems for a potential neo-Kantian ac-
count, such as that suggested in chapter three. To begin, in §1, I will set out the two 
positions, based on the discussion in previous chapters and on a more detailed expo-
sition of Burge‟s view. I will also outline the objections upon which Burge resists in-
tellectualism and present the challenge which he has formulated. In §2 and §3 I will 
examine two objections which can be made to intellectualism based on Burge‟s posi-
tion, as explicated in §1. 
§1. 
The discussion of Burge‟s representationalist theory of perception in chapter one re-
vealed that he takes perception to consist in both singular and general elements. The 
representation of some (physical) object o requires „singular reference‟ which „picks it 
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out‟ and a more general attributive which represents o as some way—e.g. o is green. 
But, though Burge believes perception would represent o as green, he believes it nei-
ther employs concepts nor is structured propositionally; instead propositional struc-
ture and employment of so-called „conceptual content‟ is reserved for other represen-
tations, such as thought. But since both serve to „pick out‟ an entity and apply a gen-
eral attributive—i.e. which can be applied to more than one particular—the distinc-
tion between perceptual and conceptual representation lies, for Burge, in the attributives 
employed. 
Perceptual attributives are general in that they can be applied to more than one 
object in more than one perceptual context. Thus both a, seen at time t, and b, seen at 
later time t1, can be perceptually represented as F; in a similar way to Evans‟ General-
ity Constraint the attributive F is „ability-general‟ in that the subject is capable of using 
it in multifarious representations (Burge, 2009 p. 259). However these general percep-
tual attributives are, Burge says, limited to singular, context-dependent applications: 
while the subject is able to use them in many representations, any single use will repre-
sent a given particular (or given plurality of particulars) in one perspectival context—
i.e. as it is seen from the (physical) perspective of one observer, at one time. For 
Burge two representations of the same object, a, can differ in context—e.g. if a is seen 
from a different angle or under different circumstances—and the representations thus 
distinguished according to the context-bound application of the attributives involved. 
Thus any one perceptual representation, ‘a is F’, constitutes a context-bound applica-
tion of F: an application which represents a under a certain mode of presentation, tied 
to the perspective of the subject at the time of perception. (The ability to perceive the 
same object (or property) as the same as one previously represented is what Burge calls 
a „Perceptual Constancy’ (2009 p. 250 and 2010a p. 408)) 
Effectively Burge is claiming that a perceptual representation of o is always a repre-
sentation which reflects contingent facts about how the object was seen at the time of 
perception. Conceptual attributives can thus be distinguished from perceptual attribu-
tives in that they do not reflect just one „way of seeing‟ o but are able to represent o in 
a way which can abstract from any one context: “[n]ot all occurrences of conceptual 
attributives accompany and guide contextual singular applications [...] or are part of a 
primary way (or indeed any way) of contextually referring to a particular” (2010a p. 
541). As such they function in a way which Burge calls purely predicational. Creatures 
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who employ these attributives are creatures who entertain distinctly conceptual 
thought: 
“In determining that the representational content of an individual‟s psychological 
state is propositional [(conceptual)], one must find an attributive in the content that 
has a purely predicative role.” (2010b p. 44) 
Burge suggests three ways in which conceptual attributives differ from perceptual 
representations: first, such attributives can be employed in universal (rather than sin-
gular) representations, e.g. „every planet is a body‟ rather than „that (perceived) o is a 
body‟ (2010b p. 42). Second, as Burge puts it, the attributive can “function predica-
tively, as part of a larger attribution, while not itself making any attribution at all” 
(ibid.). The types of attribution he has in mind here are negative claims, e.g. „that (per-
ceived) o is not a body‟, hypothetical or conditional claims like „if that (perceived) o is 
a body, it‟s far away‟ and disjunctive, or non-committal claims such as „that (per-
ceived) o is either a body or a shadow‟. Each of these claims has a referent, o, and 
functions to (potentially) attribute a property to o; yet, unlike the simple „representa-
tion as‟ in perceptual representation, none of these formulations actively represents o 
as having a certain property. Third, and finally, in a combination of the first two 
forms, conceptual attributives can function in universal, negative claims like „it is not 
the case that any non-spatial entity is a body‟ (2010b p. 43). 
Each of these forms of representation marks, as Burge puts it, a „freedom from 
the here and now‟ (2010a p. 542). What he means is that, even though they may refer 
to one particular, none of these forms of representation are necessarily tied to repre-
senting it under in one context—e.g. as I perceived it at t1—or even in a way which is 
veridical (or true) of the object. Thus a representation can be neutral as to what o is 
represented as—e.g. hypothetical statements like „if o is a body then it‟s far away‟. Fur-
ther o could be represented in a universally quantified representation—e.g. everything 
like o is a body—without the attributive „body‟ applying to one, particular, mode of 
presentation (i.e. context of perceiving) o. 
Given this line of thought it might be that one of the most intuitive features of a 
conceptual attributive is the fact that it is used in a representation which allows a sub-
ject to abstract from the actual scene they are presented with (perceive) and employ a 
form of thought which applies, not just to that situation, but to many others. What 
we might take to be the hallmark of the conceptual then is the generality of application 
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of the representations in which they might be used: hypotheticals, universals and logi-
cal truths can each be distinguished by the fact that they „go beyond‟ the facts of a 
specific (perceived) situation to either represent something which neither represents 
that situation as G nor not-G (e.g. hypotheticals) or which apply to other, similar situa-
tions (in the case of universals and abstract rules). When a singular representation ‘o is 
F’ displays this sort of generality it seems the attributive F must be conceptual and the 
representation can be said to be a thought. 
As noted Burge‟s anti-intellectualism differs from (NI) in that it claims concep-
tual representation of o can come about in creatures which are incapable of conceiv-
ing of o as within absolute space. In such a way Burge and the neo-Kantians have very 
different conceptions of the type of creature to whom singular propositional attitudes 
can be attributed. Thus Evans seems to restrict the examples in his theory of thought-
attribution to subjects who are (supposedly advanced) language-users while Burge is 
happy to even assume (in places) that propositional attitudes can be entertained by 
non-linguistic creatures, such as apes (2003 p. 519). 
This difference does not, I think, reveal that the neo-Kantians were dismissive of 
data from developmental psychology or other scientific fields; several passages and 
discussions by Evans, for example, show a knowledge of and respect for such disci-
plines (e.g. Evans 1985 and 1982 p. 156). Rather the divergence can be seen as two 
ways to understand the concept of singular thought—its usage in psychological attribu-
tion and in helping us understand the cognitive architecture of other subjects. The 
neo-Kantian conception, based largely on Evans‟ discussion, reveals a concern with 
the understanding human thought is taken to manifest. This consists in a conscious-
ness of objects as distinct from one‟s experience of them and as existing in a way 
which does not depend upon human minds to apprehend them. In this way, they 
might be thought of as Top-down approaches: they focus on what it is to have singular 
thought in our own case (i.e. as a developed human), identify an accompanying capacity 
C (e.g. linguistic abilities, capacity to conceive of the world as objective etc.) and claim 
that possession of C is necessary for entertaining singular thought. Such an approach 
resists the idea that creatures who don‟t obviously manifest C might nonetheless be 
credited with singular thought. 
Conversely, Burge seems to begin his theory with pre-linguistic humans and 
non-human animals who, according to him, can be conceived to entertain singular 
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thought. In understanding such creatures to have singular thought his commitment to 
(AI) is an encouragement to define singular thought based upon its presence in crea-
tures who are not thought of as manifesting the understanding and conceptual prow-
ess which the neo-Kantians saw as a marker of human thought. Against the neo-
Kantian then Burge‟s theory might be thought of as a Bottom-up construction of the 
concept since it demands that we begin with the least developed creatures thought to 
be capable of singular thought and define the concept from there. Since, very often, 
these creatures aren‟t thought of as possessing C (for our purposes, aren‟t thought to 
be capable of locating objects in absolute space), a bottom-up approach must claim, 
contra the intellectualist, that C isn‟t necessary for singular thought. 
Intellectualist theories have tended to be predominant in the 20th century, as 
Burge is aware. Nonetheless, as I will now show, he believes his anti-intellectualist 
position is more than a match for them. His response to intellectualism is more gen-
eral than an attack just on the neo-Kantian theory described in the last chapter: it can 
be directed at any theory which claims that, to enjoy singular thought, subjects need 
especially advanced cognitive capacities (e.g. linguistic capabilities). Nonetheless my 
question here is whether a specifically neo-Kantian version can survive and that will 
be the focus of my discussion. 
Burge‟s defence of anti-intellectualism consists of three claims. The first claim 
stresses the coherency of Burge‟s anti-intellectualist position. Recall that Burge thought 
the singular elements of perception were preserved in the transition to singular thought 
(and the „general‟ elements associated with conceptual attributives): 
“the occurrent singular elements in perception [...] are also connected to occur-
rent singular elements in propositional content [...]. Both are singular demonstra-
tive-like applications, individuated in terms of occurrent uses. The latter can take 
over the referents of the counterpart perceptual applications.” (2010a p. 546) 
If such a picture is granted then (AI)—the claim that a (thinking) subject perceiving o 
is therefore in a position to think about o, regardless of his conceptualisation of o—is 
entailed. Thus the first claim we can see Burge as making is that his position is con-
ceptually coherent. This is what I‟ll refer to as VIABILITY: 
VIABILITY:     If we grant a (global) anti-individualist account of content deter-
mination then it is easy to see how (AI) could be true. 
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VIABILITY is a fairly easy claim to make, indeed it seems an analogous claim (VIABIL-
ITY*) could be made for a theory which commits to (NI*). Nonetheless further claims 
can be made on Burge‟s behalf, for it is questionable whether someone like Evans can 
provide any motivated objections to Burge‟s view, given that Burge rejects the as-
sumption that having a thought requires understanding what it would be for that 
thought to be true. Assuming, for a moment, that there is no cogent, intellectualist 
objection to (AI)—from Evans or anyone else—the following claim can be made: 
LEGITIMACY: There is no reason to think that (AI) isn’t true. 
Even if this claim were true it would not, of course, automatically show that Burge‟s 
account of singular thought is correct. However it would show that there is no intellec-
tualist challenge Burge must overcome in establishing his anti-intellectualism. 
So far neither VIABILITY nor LEGITIMACY show that we have any reason to pre-
fer Burge‟s anti-intellectualism over any form of intellectualism. These two claims 
only show that it could be true. To present a real challenge to his intellectualise oppo-
nents Burge must provide a motivation for an anti-intellectualist account. Of course, a 
motivation to reject intellectualist conditions such as (NI*) does not automatically 
constitute an argument in favour of Burge‟s own anti-individualist account. However 
it would show that (NI*) is false and that Burge succeeds in his debate with the neo-
Kantians, consequently Burge‟s anti-intellectualist motivation must be overcome if 
neo-Kantian intellectualism is to remain a viable account of singular thought. 
The first motivation claim (M1) asserts that both animals and young children can 
be attributed with propositional thought, even in the absence of the advanced intel-
lectual capacities required to conceive of an objective world. As Burge puts it: 
“there are empirical explanations that attribute propositional attitudes to higher 
animals and young children. They do not attribute any of the supplemental capa-
bilities that individual representationalists [intellectualists] demanded.” (2010a p. 
545) 
The essence of this position is that an intellectualist understanding of singular thought 
is incompatible with our uses of this concept both in commonsense attributions and 
in scientific explanation (as Burge remarks earlier “[c]ommon sense and empirical sci-
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ence supports the view that animals and young children have perceptions and beliefs 
about bodies” (2010a p. 162)):  
(M1):   An intellectualist account of singular thought would be incompatible 
with (our best) commonsense and scientific uses of the concept. 
If true this would surely provide compelling reason to reject an intellectualist account 
in favour of one which can allow for a more liberal attribution of singular thought to 
less developed creatures. 
However, given an anti-intellectualist VIABILITY and LEGITIMACY, a further moti-
vation claim can be developed. This relates back to the Justificatory Challenge posed by an 
anti-intellectualist account, which was discussed in the Introduction. The thought is 
that, if an anti-intellectualist theory is a coherent and viable account of mental 
representation (or singular thought), the intellectualist must justify why we should 
think that a more demanding condition (like (NI*)) applies. In essence it demands 
that Evans substantiate his assumption (outlined in chapter two) that a subject must 
understand his thought in order to entertain it. The greatest challenge VIABILITY and 
LEGITIMACY can provide is the suspicion that the Top-down approach—which 
reccommends the adoption of (the adult human) capacity C as a necessary condition 
on singular thought—is wholly arbitrary. There is no reason to think that the adult 
human is a privileged subject with regard to singular thought, and if we can „make 
sense‟ of a conception which does not require subjects to possess C then surely there 
must be an argument for the claim that such possession is a necessary condition. 
Thus the second motivation for an anti-intellectualist account: 
(M2):    We must be given reason to think that a (cognitively) more demanding 
condition is necessary for a subject to enjoy singular thought. 
The question facing us is whether there can be a response to (M1) and (M2) which 
would show that (NI*) remains a viable condition on singular thought (as noted, I 
take the ultimate truth of Burge‟s individual anti-intellectualist theory to be a slightly 
tangential question which I will not address). In the next section I will address (M1) 
and in §3 I will move on to (M2). 
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§2. 
To begin to assess (M1) we should first ask what reasons we might have to think that 
undeveloped subjects could have singular thought. As Burge suggests, the most justi-
fiable indication that a creature has propositional (here co-variant with conceptual) 
thought is the demonstration that he is capable of inference (2010b p. 45) (2010a p. 
542). Here I will begin by showing why Burge takes inferential thought to indicate the 
presence of conceptual attributives and singular thought, I will then present and as-
sess his reasons for thinking that undeveloped subjects, such as animals, manifest 
such capacities. 
§2.1. 
In this context inference is taken to be a transition of (psychological) representations 
which „follows‟ a logical rule. A transition of representations (i.e. one representa-
tion—e.g. that is dangerous—giving rise to another representation—e.g. I should run 
away) is taken to be a key feature in informational processing systems and explains 
how one mental event (e.g. perception) can lead to another (mental) event (e.g. an 
intention to act). An inferential transition can be can be distinguished from the mere 
association of representations. An association of representations means, broadly, that 
the presence of one representation causes the „activation or inhibition‟ of another rep-
resentation according to whether the subject has been conditioned to associate the rep-
resentations in this way (see Shanks, 2006 p. 294). For example, a creature in some 
experimental setup might learn that pressing down a lever (LD) causes a reward to be 
delivered (LD+). 
Conversely to call a transition „inferential‟ is commonly to imply that there was 
some rule or reason behind it—e.g. to reflect the logical relations between the 
representations. In performing an inference (in the sense under discussion) one 
representation, A, gives rise to another, B, because the subject is attempting to „map‟ 
the fact that a A entails B—e.g. my reason for representing ‘o is mortal’ after „o is a man’ 
is because it is entailed (from the rule „all men are mortal‟). One way of putting this is 
that a subject represents one thing and not another because a proposition expressing A 
entails a proposition expressing B. While an association of representations relies on the 
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subject associating „by habit‟ an inferential transition relies on them associating 
according to a general rule. 
One might think that a capacity for inferential thought reflects rationality or 
human-like linguistic capacities. But Burge is adamant that a creature can be capable 
of such thought without understanding or representing the abstract rules behind it. 
Rather understanding such thought is a „metarepresentational‟ capacity which not all 
creatures capable of inference need be taken to share (2010b p. 56). 
Despite this, a capacity for inference might be thought to obviously manifest a 
capacity for conceptual thought (and therefore for conceptual singular representation 
of objects): what is logical deduction if not a conceptual affair? However Burge‟s 
claim—that a creature can infer without representing the abstract rule by which A 
entails B—seemingly means that otherwise unassuming transitions can count as infer-
ences for Burge; consider his own example: 
1) This (perceived object) a is not G. 
2) This (perceived object) a is identical with that (perceived object) b. 
3) That (perceived object) b is not G. 
(2010a p. 543)17 
Here the steps (1)-(3) indicate a transition of representations ending in the conclusion 
(3). It may be thought distinctly inferential because, having represented (1) and (2), 
the subject is able to „draw the conclusion‟ (3): he „sees‟ that (3) is entailed. The ques-
tion however is why the ability to draw this conclusion implies that (1)-(3) are concep-
tual. Burge‟s answer is that the “use of the attributive G in the inference does not de-
pend on being tied to any particular instance of being G” (ibid.). This is to say that the 
use of G is not tied to representing any one individual, in any one context as G. I take 
it this is meant to show that an object, b, is singularly represented (in a conceptual 
representation) because, if G is used conceptually in (1)-(2) then it is used conceptu-
ally in (3). 
The problem for Burge is that (1)-(3) is not emblematic of an inference as we 
would ordinarily understand it. The reason for this is that an extra step is required to 
show why (1)-(2) entail the conclusion (3): 
 
                                                     
17 The parentheses and use of lower case variables are my own additions. 
- 71 - 
 
1)    This (perceived object) a is not G. 
2)    This (perceived object) a is identical with that (perceived object) b. 
3`)   (For all objects x and y) If x(not-G) and (x is identical to y) then y(not- G). 
4`)   From (3`), If (perceived object) a is not G and a is identical with   (per-
ceived object) b then b is not G. 
5`)   From (2) and (4`), (perceived object) b is not G. 
 
For Burge it would be problematic if all attributions of inference required 
representations like (3`) for it is unclear that the type of creatures he thinks capable of 
inference are capable of this form of abstract thought. Indeed it might be 
counterintuitive to suppose that all instances of inference—even in humans—
required representing something as abstract and formulaic as (3`); though such 
representations needn‟t be conscious it is unclear that we would ever describe our 
everyday inferences as involving these abstract rules. 
Nonetheless (1)-(3) still seems incomplete as an example of an inference and as 
such it is hard to understand why G is used conceptually. Based on his own 
explanation of what distinguishes conceptual attributives—their independence of 
representing an object in any perspectival context—Burge may have two reasons for 
saying so. Firstly G is used in a negation, which Burge took to be an example of 
conceptual thought. However this claim could face a plausible objection: Burge might 
be right to think that perception couldn‟t function to represent something as not-G—
what would it mean, for example, to say that I saw o as not an apple rather than saw o 
as a pear? Instead perception seems to work to present a positive picture of the world, 
rather than a negative picture of what the world is not. But while it is easy to admit 
that a negative representation can‟t be perceptual, it does not seem necessary to say 
that an attributive which is not employed in perceptual representation is conceptual. 
Instead, it might be possible to conceive of non-conceptual, representational states 
(perhaps further on in a processing system) which employed negative representation. 
For example, a creature might represent, say, that there was no food in a given loca-
tion or that an object close-by wasn‟t dangerous. Such representations may still repre-
sent an object in a context-dependent way—i.e. as it is seen in one instance of obser-
vation, from one perspective etc.—even though they represent it as not being some 
way. 
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Alternatively Burge might claim that one of the representations must be thought 
to manifest the generality indicative of conceptual representation (as discussed in 
§1)—i.e. a representation which does not apply to a or b as perceived in one context, 
but which applies to them more generally. The most plausible candidate is (2), since 
both (1) and (3) are singular representations of one object at one time of perception. 
Suppose that ‘a’  and ‘b’ refer to the same object, o, represented in two different con-
texts or two different occasions of perception—e.g. ‘a’ is o seen from the left at t1 
while ‘b’ is o seen from the right at t1; (2) thus represents that the same object is re-
ferred to in each of these representational contexts. However it may remain unclear 
whether (2) represents this in a way which is essentially context-independent and 
therefore, according to Burge‟s standards, conceptual. It might be thought that, since 
(2) represents o (as represented) in two, specific contexts—a and b—(2) fails to „tran-
scend‟ a representational context and is „tied‟ to representing o in a context-dependent 
way. Yet further reflection could reveal this line of thought to be misguided: though 
(2) represents a and b, which represent o as seen from one particular physical position 
at one particular time, it does not, in fact, represent o as it is seen in any particular 
context. Rather it might be said to relate two context dependent representations in a 
way which abstracts from any representational context: it might be thought that (2) 
reflects that ‘a is identical to b’ simpliciter and not merely on one occasion of representa-
tion or within one representational context. 
However, even if this claim can be allowed, it might be asked why G—and not 
merely the attributive ‘is identical to’—should be thought of as conceptual. If it is con-
ceded that (2) is conceptual then it may be alleged (1) need only be non-conceptual, 
since it only functions to show that some object, represented in a context-dependent 
way (as discussed above ‘a’ refers to the object o as seen from the left at a certain 
time) is not-G (which, as previously discussed, needn‟t be conceptual). Since (3) is of 
the same form as (1) it might be thought that it too could be non-conceptual. How-
ever, if (2) is a conceptual representation, and (2) causes the transition to (3)—as was 
taken to be essential to an inferential transition—then it might be thought intuitive to 
say that (3) (at least) is also conceptual. But this thought could be questioned: the rep-
resentation ‘b is not-G’ represents an object, o, in a given context (seen from the right 
at a certain time) in a way which could be non-conceptual—there is no hint of the 
generality or independence of context which characterises conceptual representations. 
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To avoid this objection it might be necessary for Burge to show that the transi-
tion could not take place without using G as a conceptual attributive. One way of do-
ing this may be to add another step to (1)-(3)—albeit one which avoids the abstrac-
tion of (3`): 
1)     This (perceived object) a is not G. 
2)     This (perceived object) a is identical with that (perceived object) b. 
3``)  If (perceived object) a is not G and a is identical with (perceived object) b 
then b is not G. 
4``)  That (perceived object) b is not G. 
Here the conclusion—now (4``)—is entailed by (1)-(2) and the general rule (3``). 
Adding this rule as a representation in the transition not only makes it more obvious 
why (1)-(4``) is inferential but also, arguably, manifests a use of G as a conceptual 
attributive. The reason for this is that (3``) expresses the generality of a conceptual 
representation: it is hypothetical meaning that, schematically, it is not representing any 
object, o, as being any particular way in any particular context. Further, as a rule, (3``), 
like (2), relates context-dependent representations without itself being context-
dependent: (3``) is true simpliciter and is not tied to any representation in any particular 
context. 
If G is used conceptually in (3``) then it may be alleged that it should be thought 
of as conceptual in (4``). The reason for this is that it might seem slightly odd to sug-
gest that within a transition of representations a subject could employ conceptual at-
tributives at one stage, (3``), and yet not employ them at a later stage, (4``). Of course 
such an assumption could be denied, but it may not then result in the most intuitive 
understanding of inferential reasoning: if this necessarily employs conceptual attribu-
tives at one stage then there is no reason to think that these attributives wouldn‟t be 
preserved in later stages. 
This also provides an answer to the original question of this section: why a ca-
pacity for inference might manifest the capacity for conceptual representation. The 
answer we can provide, based on this discussion, is that all transitions of representa-
tions which are considered „inferential‟ will require a representation like (3``) (or per-
haps, at least (2))—i.e. will require a representation which abstracts from any particu-
lar context and manifests the generality indicative of a conceptual representation. A 
- 74 - 
 
further question here is whether this automatically shows the capacity for singular 
thought—i.e. conceptual representation of individual objects. As the discussion of 
this section has shown, if an attributive is used conceptually at one stage of the transi-
tion—e.g. at (3``)—then it seems it will be used conceptually at later stages; however 
if a different attributive is used conceptually—e.g. ‘is identical to’ in (2)—then it seems 
unclear why distinct attributives at later stages should be thought of as conceptual. 
Consequently Burge seems right to suppose that a capacity for inference mani-
fests the capacity for conceptual representation. Though this does not automatically 
reveal that such subjects singularly represent objects in conceptual representations 
(since there are instances of inferences which do not necessarily suggest such singular 
representation) it is reasonable to suppose, as Burge seemingly does, that a capacity to 
represent conceptually is suggestive of a capacity to singularly represent in conceptual 
content, or to have object-directed thought. Now I turn to Burge‟s evidence for his 
claim that cognitively less-developed subjects, like apes, display the capacity for such 
thought by showing the capacity for inference. 
§2.2. 
Burge appeals to specific empirical studies to support his claim that undeveloped sub-
jects—notably non-human animals—are capable of inferential thought. In this sec-
tion I will go through these pieces of evidence in turn and indicate whether they pro-
vide sufficient support for his claim. 
The first two pieces of evidence come from a range of experiments performed 
by Joseph Call on primate subjects—specifically a selection of twelve chimpanzees, 
eight gorillas, four bonobos and six orang-utans (Call, 2004 p. 234). These experi-
ments consisted in placing food in one of two, opaque cups (complete with lids) and 
getting the apes to choose between them under various experimental conditions. The 
cups were filled behind an opaque screen (the experimenter placed his hand into each 
cup, though he only left food in one) before the screen was removed and the apes 
were required to make their choice. 
In the first case (Visual Empty) the experimenter still filled the cups behind the 
screen—hence the ape was presumed to be aware that food was going into the 
cups—but, once the screen was removed, he lifted the lid of the empty cup and 
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showed the contents to the ape before replacing the lid and waiting for them to 
choose. According to Call each subject showed an „above chance‟ preference for the 
baited cup across sixteen trials in this condition—i.e. they chose the right cup in more 
that 50% of trials—and there was a high mean average for correct choices (2004 p. 
235) (also see Fig.1). Burge seems heavily swayed by these results: 
“Some types of animal do not immediately choose the non-empty container. 
They either continue to search the empty container; or they merely show an in-
crease in the likelihood of searching the other container. But some non-human 
animals, including apes, show the sort of behaviour that suggests deductive in-
ference. They immediately choose the non-empty place, without needing to look 
into it.” (2010b p. 59) 
The key factor at work here seems to be that the apes are not given direct visual in-
formation of where the food is located. Rather, on seeing that one cup is empty they 
are taken to infer that the other must contain the food and choose accordingly. 
The second case which Burge cites purportedly reveals an analogous result in the 
auditory modality (Auditory Empty) (Burge, 2010b p. 61). In this condition the experi-
menter fills the cup as before but this time shakes the empty cup and lifts the baited 
cup, without shaking it. Were the (shaken) cup baited it would make a noise thus 
those capable of inference would be able to work out that the food (if it were in any 
container) would be in the non-shaken one. Again Call claims that the subjects per-
formed „above average‟ in the Auditory Empty condition (2004 p. 235) (although the 
mean average is significantly lower than in Visual Empty, see Fig.1). Subjects were 
more successful than in the Control conditions, where they were given no information 
about the location of the food and seem to have chosen at random. The divergence 
here seems to show that, even in Auditory Empty, the information they receive enables 
them to make the correct choice in a greater number of cases. 
 
 
 
[Chart omitted; copyright unavailable] 
 
 
Figure 1. (From Call, 2004 p. 235) Mean percentages correct for Visual-Empty and Audi-
tory-Empty. 
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Call employs a number of measures to ensure that the animals are not choosing 
the baited cup out of any bias other that the idea that it contains the food. Yet neither 
of these instances presents a highly compelling case for the claim that animals enjoy 
inferences. As Penn and Povinelli point out, one can raise significant doubts about 
such a conclusion based on Call‟s experiments: 
“It seems quite plausible [...] that these captive apes had previously learned that a 
shaking noise (N) combined with a shaking motion (M) is jointly indicative of a 
reward (NM+), whereas [...] a shaking motion without a shaking noise (M-) is 
not.” (2007 p. 110) 
What they suggest is that the apes discern the location of the food, not through a de-
ductive inference, but through an association of representations. The idea here is 
presumably that, on not associating (M-) with reward, but even perhaps associating it 
with a lack of reward, the apes choose the other cup. 
Penn and Povinelli offer a second, perhaps more serious, consideration against 
Call‟s (and Burge‟s) conclusion. This focuses on a further experiment Call performs 
which was designed to show that subjects were not choosing the unshaken cup 
because of an aversion to noiseless shaken cups. In this condition (Shake-Rotate) the 
experimenter presents both an empty cup which is shaken (and therefore noiseless) 
and a similarly empty cup which is rotated (and also noiseless). The idea is that if they 
had an aversion to the noiseless shaken cup they should prefer the noiseless rotated 
one. However, as Call claims, the subjects showed a „significant preference‟ for the 
shaken cup—choosing it in about 70% of the eight trials (2004 p. 236). However, as 
Penn and Povinelli point out: 
“If the apes had in fact understood the causal-logical relationship involved they 
would have inferred that neither cup contained food and would have chosen 
randomly between the two cups or, if anything, would have preferred the rotated 
cup.” (ibid.) 
What this consideration might suggest is that the apes were not choosing on the basis 
of an understanding of the relations in play but were making their choice by other 
means—the association of a certain stimulus with the presence or absence of a 
reward. 
Perhaps it might be claimed that the apes showed evidence of inferential thought 
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in selecting any cup at all. Thus even if they did not select the baited cup on the basis 
of a deep understanding of the causal relations involved they may hev used the 
association of (M-) (motion without noise) and „no-reward‟ to infer that there was a 
greater likelihood of the food being in the alternative cup. Such an inference may take 
the following form: 
1) If (cup) A isn‟t baited then B is. 
2) A isn‟t baited. 
3) From (1), B is baited. 
Here (2) could be based on a non-conceptual association (i.e. could arise because of 
the perception of (M-)) but (1)—a hypothetical—employs a conceptual attributive, 
based on the reasoning in §2. 
But if Penn and Povinelli are right then this scenario seems very unlikely. What is 
important to note is that, at the beginning of both Visual Empty and Auditory Empty 
each of the subjects has gone through at least seventy-two trials (in previous 
conditions) where they are required to select one of the cups. Thus it could be that 
they are prompted to select a cup, not from an inference which suggests that the food 
is in one cup, but only from either habit or an association between selecting a cup and 
receiving a reward. Consequently neither of these cases categorically suggest that 
subjects employ an inference like (1)-(3). 
To salvage Burge‟s claim (at least, as a claim which can be based on the evidence 
he cites) we must turn to Burge‟s third piece of evidence. This concerns an alternative 
series of experiments performed by Call on ape subjects (specifically six orang-utans, 
seven gorillas and four bonobos (Call, 2007 p. 4)). In this experiment the subjects 
were also required to choose between two different locations, one of which contained 
food. However the food was hidden, not in a cup, but beneath one of two rectangular 
wooden boards on the table before the experimenter. The experimenter placed the 
food under one of the boards behind an opaque screen, removing the screen before 
subjects made their choice. In the Inclined condition the boards had no other support 
but (potentially) the food hence the unbaited board laid flat on the table and the 
baited board lay at an angle of about 30°. In making their choice, as Call puts it, “five 
(out of seven) gorillas, three (out of four) bonobos and three (out of six) orang-utans 
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were above chance in the Inclined condition” (2007 p. 7). For each species there was, 
therefore, a significantly high mean average of correct choices (see Fig.2). 
 
 
Figure 2. (From Call, 2007 p. 7) Mean percent correct in the Inclined Condition. 
 
Again Burge makes a great deal of this conclusion: 
“Presumably the relevant cognitive competence takes body size into account, 
and is sensitive to the effect of the body‟s solidity on movement of the screen. 
Here cognitions of solidity, (something-like) causation, and object-permanence 
are engaged in exclusion transition.” (2010b p. 61) 
Unlike the conclusion from the previous two cases this data seemingly shows, as 
Burge suggests, that the apes have grasped a variety of (possibly conceptual) 
attributives, including object-permanence. Each of these claims will need to be 
analysed in turn. To begin though I will address the main conclusion (from Call and 
Burge) that this data shows that apes have inferred the location of the food. 
The first problematic feature of this series of experiments is that a worry similar 
to Penn and Povinelli‟s second point can be raised: the subjects‟ apparent 
understanding of the causal-relations involved doesn‟t generalise. In another 
condition (called Inclined Block) the experimenter baited one of the boards (such that it 
inclined by 30°) and placed a wooden block (but no food) behind the other so it also 
inclined by 30°; as Call describes it: “both boards displayed a 30° inclination 
approximately and subjects were able to see that one of the boards rested on the 
wooden support, which protruded from behind the board from the subject‟s 
perspective” (2007 pp. 8-9). If subjects did understand the underlying effects of body 
and solidity (such that they were able to infer the location of the food) we might 
expect them to choose the baited board since, as Call seemingly agrees, “subjects 
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could have solved the problem if they had considered the food as the only reason for 
the inclination of the board without a protruding block” (2007 p. 10). However no 
subject was above chance in the Inclined Block condition and the mean average 
indicates that the subjects were correct only about 50% of the time (indicating that 
they may have just chosen at random) (ibid. and see Fig.3). 
There may be many ways of explaining the lack of positive results here but it 
does invite the hypothesis that, when the subjects choose between a flat (unbaited) 
and an inclined (baited) board they may not be doing so from a deep understanding 
of the relations involved or the effects of solidity. Rather they may have come to learn 
that a inclined board is more likely to produce food than a flat one. 
 
Figure 3. (From Call 2007, p.9) Mean percent correct in the Inclined-Block condition. 
 
As in the above discussion of Penn and Povinelli‟s point it can still be alleged 
that the subjects employed an inference of the following form: 
4) One should always pick boards at larger inclinations. 
5) A is at a larger inclination than B. 
6) Therefore pick A. 
Since (4) is a universal claim „larger inclinations‟ will function as a conceptual 
attributive. Nonetheless the claim that the apes don‟t necessarily understand the causal 
relations at play makes such an inference inessential: it may just be that apes have 
evolved to search for food under larger protruberances which can mean that the 
transition between the representations „A is at a larger inclination than B‟ and „A 
contains the food‟ will be associative and therefore will not employ a conceptual 
representation like (4). 
But even if it can be (reasonably) denied that the apes perform an inference in 
picking the baited board it still seems that they realise the food exists even though they 
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cannot see it. Indeed, as Call points out, both infants‟ and non-human animals‟ 
responses to object-protruberance are taken to be signs of an awareness of „object-
permanence‟ (see Call 2007, p. 2-4). Roughly it seems we can understand object-
permanence as the idea that a (perceived) object o continues to exist (perhaps in a 
cup, or under a board) even though o cannot be seen. Such awareness enables the 
representations „o is over there‟ or, more generally, „food is over there‟. 
From the above quotation it is unclear whether Burge takes this awareness to be 
indicative of distinctly conceptual abilities—i.e. whether he takes the preponderance 
to search for food under the boards as the hallmark of inferential thought or as 
employing conceptual attributives. It could be taken as an activity which indicates the 
presence of conceptual abilities because it could be performed on the basis of an 
inference like: 
7)     If I have seen food go behind a screen and now see an inclined board, 
then the food is likely to be under the board. 
8)     I saw food taken behind a screen and now I see an inclined board. 
9)     The food is likely to be under the board. 
Alternatively it might be thought that an attributive employed in a way which allows 
for (the awareness of) object-permanence displays the kind of complexity associated 
with conceptual attributives. If a representation like „that is food‟ (arising on the 
perception of food as it is displayed by the experimenter before being placed behind 
one of the boards) contains an attributive—„food‟—which allows the creature to 
conceive of the object as existing unperceived then this seems to reveal a complexity 
of thought which is indicative of conceptual representations. 
However this latter point seems to be of little use to Burge since the capacity to 
conceive of an object as existing unobserved is one of the capacities necessary for 
(NI). Thus, if he is proposing to attribute such capacities to (what were supposedly) 
„less developed‟ creatures, then his motivation claim does not stand in opposition to 
neo-Kantian intellectualism. 
Yet there is no reason to think that an awareness of „object-permanence‟ shows 
the employment of an inference like (7)-(9). The reason for this is that it is not 
difficult to see the transition from „there was food‟ to „food is there [underneath that 
board]‟ as the result of association rather than inference. Having seen food in the 
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vicinity we can suppose that it will be of great evolutionary advantage for an animal to 
be inclined to search for food and to see large protruberances as possible locations. 
Such an explanation involves a behavioural output which, importantly, does not 
require the subject to employ a distinctly conceptual attributive, or inferential 
transition over an association of (non-conceptual) representations. 
This section has been concerned with the specifically scientific evidence in 
favour of (M1) and has provided significant doubts for each bit of evidence Burge 
advances. But (M1) appeals not just to science but to „commonsense‟—i.e. the folk 
psychological attributions which must form part of our psychological repertoire. Half 
of the claim of (M1) is that a non-intellectualist understanding of singular thought is 
required to make sense of our folk psychological usage of the concept. 
But it is difficult to see what evidence could be offered in defence of such a 
claim. To assert that folk psychological attributions require a non-intellectualist un-
derstanding of singular thought one would have to claim that to conceive of infants 
and animals as incapable of thought would thoroughly distort our normal, folk psy-
chological attributions and way of characterising and conceiving of their mental lives. 
Ostensibly such a view might seem compelling: we often describe such creatures as 
„thinking‟ of various things (e.g. a toy, their dinner etc.) and use such comments to 
explain their actions and behaviour—e.g. „the dog went to the door because he knew 
his master was coming home‟, „the baby is wailing because he thinks it‟s dinnertime‟ 
etc. Yet, however prevalent such descriptions, it seems hard to discern any embedded 
commitment to the view that infants and animals enjoy thought—and  such charac-
terisations are literal—rather than a merely metaphorical use which remains neutral on 
their actual mental states. It is difficult to work out whether, in using these descrip-
tions, I am attributing to the infant the same thing I attribute to an adult human, 
namely a fully-fledged thought. It is difficult to imagine whether anyone, if pressed on 
such a question, would commit to such a statement about this creature‟s psychology 
or would remain neutral. Certainly if this commitment were a deep-seated part of our 
conception of infant and animal-psychology it would be remarkable that so few psy-
chological studies—so few interpretations of data like that given above—do not at-
tribute these abilities more liberally. 
It is at least possible that this sort of „commonsense‟ description of an infant or 
an animal is but a way of explaining their behaviour „based on our own case‟ and is 
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therefore metaphorical, and self-consciously anthropomorphic. A better defence of 
(M1) which can be provided by this „folk psychological‟ view may bring us back to the 
scientific sphere. When apes (or other species) perform tasks to the same standard as, 
say, human children—old enough, let‟s assume, that we are happy to attribute 
conceptual thought—then, intuitively, we are right to say that there is a parallel and 
thus are right to attribute similar conceptual abilities to the two groups (apes and 
children). Drawing this parallel between them, such a defence might claim, is 
inkeeping with our folk psychological concept, and therefore inkeeping with the best 
understanding of singular thought. 
However it is unclear that the worries raised with the evidence cited by Burge are 
really at odds with a „commonsense‟ understanding of the case. If the apparent 
abilities manifested in one condition seem contradicted by performance in another 
then the „commonsense‟ answer seems to be that they never had those abilities in the 
first place. It would be difficult to rest an entire defence of non-intellectualist theories 
on such commonsense attributions as, being too heavily guided by intuition runs a 
serious risk of anthropomorphising the subjects under discussion. 
Overall then it seems that none of the evidence Burge provides can function 
individually or cumulatively to give reason to think that apes engage in conceptual 
inference. Indeed, Burge is probably not wedded to these specific cases and there will 
be other studies which can be cited as evidence that less developed species employ 
conceptual attributives. However the broader point being made here is that such 
studies can also admit of alternative explanations and thus opposition to Burge‟s 
desired conclusion—for example, Penn and Povinelli (2007) and Penn, Povinelli and 
Holyoak (2008) are both wide-ranging, psychological discussions against the thesis 
that animals possess similar cognitive capacities to humans. What this shows is 
perhaps that there is still significant enough debate that Burge is not yet quite entitled 
to say that an intellectualist understanding of singular thought is incompatible with 
our best comparative or developmental psychology. Certainly the evidence he has 
cited himself can be reasonably denied by an intellectualist opponent; further it seems 
unclear that such a denial would constitute a break with the only predominant or 
respectable theories in the relevant scientific fields. Nonetheless (M1) is a positive, 
empirical claim, which it seems Burge must substantiate if he is to use it to show that 
- 83 - 
 
intellectualism is patently false. What I have tried to show here is that such 
substantiation may still be required. 
§3. 
With (M1) abandoned we might question whether (M2) can also be removed and thus 
whether it is possible to formulate a set of intellectualist claims, isomorphic to Burge‟s 
anti-intellectualist position in §1. Burge‟s first claim, VIABILITY, was trivially derived 
from the mere coherence of the theory. Likewise the intellectualist claim, VIABILITY*, 
can be formulated with equivalent ease: 
VIABILITY*: It is easy to see that (NI*) could be true. 
What this claims is that, from our own case, it is easy to see how all instances of 
singular thought about an object, must locate that object in absolute space. 
However (M2) claimed that, given the coherency of an anti-intellectualist 
account—i.e. given the truth of VIABILITY and LEGITIMACY—an intellectualist must 
justify his claim that a cognitively more demanding condition should be placed on 
entertaining singular thought. What is required then is a reason to think that a given 
capacity C might be a necessary requirement for singular thought. To defend (NI) it 
must be shown that a capacity to conceive of o as within Absolute Space should be 
thought of as a necessary requirement for singular thought; in other words, that 
singular thought should not be attributed to creatures thought to lack this capacity. 
Such an argument can be found in Evans‟ distinction between egocentric and 
absolute informational states. It will be recalled that Evans takes the mark of object-
involving thought to be that it cannot be spelled out in purely egocentric terms. For 
Evans however, a subject‟s behaviour and reactions to a given stimulus can be 
explained by a state which locates that stimulus purely egocentrically. In the last 
chapter it was shown that such states can be specified with general, non-object-
directed content like „food here‟ or „danger there‟. I‟ll refer to this claim (that an 
adequate psychological explanation of (some forms of) behavioural output can make 
use only of non-object-directed states) as Psychological Parsimony. 
When it comes to deciding the content which should be attributed to subjects 
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Evans seems to be in favour of such parsimony. If such parsomony is admitted—i.e. 
if it is admitted that non-object-directed representational states can form a part of 
psychological explanation—then an Explanatory Challenge can be mounted which 
shows the need for a principle like (NI*): given that many external signals—e.g. 
behavioural output—can be explained using non-object-directed states, how do we 
distinguish between those cases and cases where an object-directed conceptual state 
must be employed? 
It is tempting to read Evans as claiming that these purely eogcentric, behavioural 
states are non-conceptual, while all non-egocentric states are conceptual. However, to 
widen the scope of this challenge, such a view could be resisted. Instead what could 
be distinctive of purely egocentric states is not that they don‟t employ concepts, but 
that they aren‟t object-directed; thus the attributive in „food here‟ could very well be a 
„conceptual attributive‟ (as defined in §1), which is not predicated of an object but is 
used in a conceptual representational state which governs behaviour.18 Thus even if 
certain creatures are thought to employ conceptual attributives (e.g. because they 
engage in inferential thought), accepting parsimony means that they need not 
atuomatically employ object-directed representations. 
The proponent of (NI) can easily answer such a challenge: object-directed 
thoughts should only be attributed to subjects who manifest an understanding of such 
thoughts (as per the theory endorsed in chapter three). As the last two chapters have 
made clear a purely egocentric location manifests an episodic ability to react to a given 
stimulus but does not manifest an understanding that the source of this stimulus will be 
an object. As such, purely egocentric location was not seen to be a reliable indicator 
of an object-directed thought. If a subject can be thought to understand his object-
directed thought—i.e. understand what it is for the world to contain an object (which 
is food)—then he must be considered to distinguish between the object and his 
experience of it. It is only in this way that he will be able to conceive of the object as 
something which is not just tied to a behavioural response but which can occupy 
states (like being food) independently of his reaction to it. This was seen to require 
                                                     
18 Importantly I am not committing to the idea that all egocentric states are conceptual. Evans‟ insis-
tence on the immediacy of such states—that we discern the direction of the sound „without calculation‟ 
(1985 p. 384)—might preclude this. I am only suggesting that conceptual egocentric states should be 
possible. 
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the capacity to think about an object even when it is not directly related to a subject‟s 
location at t (the time of perception). 
Thus, to answer the original challenge: cases which require an object-driected 
representation are those in which a subject is presumed to have a deeper level of 
thought about the object, one which enables them to think of it in ways which are not 
indexed to its current (spatial) relation to them. Cases which do not require (the 
attribution of) such object-directed representations are those in which such a deep 
level of thought cannot be presumed: cases which involve subjects not thought to 
possess the intellectual capacities which enable such thought. In this way an 
intellectualist theory like (NI) can begin to justify a top-down construction of the 
concept—i.e. one which begins with its manifestation in adult humans. In adopting 
those features which make us conscious that we enjoy object-directed (rather than non 
object-directed) thought as necessary conditions for singular thought we are, it might be 
claimed, in a better position to track cases of genuine object-directed thought rather 
than non object-directed representations. In such a way the original objection to an 
intellectualist account—that (NI) is an entirely arbitrary condition to place on singular 
thought—is harder to motivate: such intellectualist requirements are needed to 
answer the explanatory challenge. 
It is therefore incumbent on an opponent of intellectualism (or (NI) specifically) 
to either provide an anti-intellectualist (or non-(NI)) response to the challenge, or to 
reject it entirely. Burge might press the latter option: he may reject the challenge 
because he would deny the parsimony claim. In chapter two it was seen that Burge 
propounds that singular representation of objects is preserved in the transition from 
perceptual representations to thought. He may admit that it is coherent (and 
sufficient) to explain behaviour in terms of (both conceptual and non-conceptual) 
non-object-directed states like „food here‟. However, since he believes that perception 
singularly represents and that such singular representation is preserved in other (non-
perceptual) representations, there is no reason to suppose that non-object-directed 
representations should be used in psychological explanations. In other words if 
preservation is accepted then it seems parsimony and the entire explanatory challenge 
can be avoided. 
Nonetheless it is hard to find reason to accept preservation over parsimony: Burge 
himself provides no objection to parsimony nor principled defence of preservation, 
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indeed it merely seems to be an assumption on his part. Importantly—as should be 
clear—preservation is not entailed by Burge‟s theory of perception: one can easily 
maintain that perceptual representations do singularly represent and are determined 
anti-individualistically without having to accept that this transposes to all 
representational states. As such one can admit Burge‟s theory of perception while 
remaining parsimonious about non-perceptual representational states. 
To form an intellectualist MOTIVATION* it would be necessary to show that 
parsimony should be assumed (and that neo-kantianismis best suited to answering it). In 
this way neo-Kantian intellectualism would be able to mount a significant challenge to 
Burge‟s position. However that is not something I will pursue here; instead it is 
sufficient to show that an intellectualist requirement like (NI*) should not be 
dismissed as „arbitrary‟ simply because a less demanding alternative is available. Both 
the neo-kantian (NI*) and the Burgian (AI) are based on assumptions which neither 
side has justified to the other; despite this neither of the main assumptions seems 
obviously false, or liable to be dropped in favour of the opposing alternative. As such 
the two views seem in genuine stalemate. 
The discussion of this chapter has, I think, shown that Burge has much further 
to go in undermining an intellectualist rival to his principle (AI). First his main claim 
against such theories—(M1)—seems under-supported both by the explicit evidence 
he gives in favour of it and the relevant scientific fields to which he implicitly appeals. 
Second, even if these appeals can be granted—i.e. even if it is accepted that less 
developed creatures do employ inferential thought and therefore conceptual 
attributives—a proponent of (NI*) can raise the explanatory challenge by questioning 
how we can be sure that these conceptual attributives are employed in object-
directed, rather than non-object-directed, representations. The problem here is that, 
unless we accept Burge‟s idea of preservation—which he has given us no reason to 
assume over parsimony—he is immensely vulnerable to this challenge. 
As such it is reasonable to conclude that Burge‟s theorising on mental 
represenations has not implicitly shown the falsity of the neo-Kantian (NI*). In 
chapter one it was shown that one of his main objections to both Strawson and 
Evans—that their theories conflicted with his account of perception—was not a firm 
basis on which to reject a theory inspired by the discussions of these theorists. In 
chapters two and three it was seen that the concerns which motivated Strawson and 
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Evans—i.e. a subject‟s consciousness and understanding of their own mental states, a 
distinction between one‟s experience and the objective world etc.—lead to a 
fundamentally different account of singular thought than Burge‟s anti-intellectualist 
alternative: this was taken to constitute a proper debate between the two forms of 
theory. The summation of these concerns are reflected in (NI*), which chapter three 
showed can be divorced from the overblown demands of Russell‟s Principle, and 
which reflects a view I‟ve been referring to as neo-Kantian intellectualism. What this 
chapter has shown is that that view is not conclusively undermined either by Burge‟s 
stated objections to intellectualism or by the mere viability of an anti-intellectualist 
alternative. Indeed the viability of the explanatory challenge means that (NI*) might 
be an indispensable account of singular thought. 
A far greater discussion of the competing intellectualist/anti-intellectualist 
assumptions would be required to come to a reasoned conclusion as to which is the 
preferable account of singular thought. Indeed it is perhaps likely that neither of these 
extreme views will actually present the best theory. However, it may only be through 
discussing and comparing such theories that we will find a decent account of the 
nature of singular thought. What I have shown here is that Burge‟s anti-intellectualism 
does not sweep aside his intellectualist rivals and neo-Kantian intellectualism remains 
a viable alternative. 
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